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T
HEactivities of the National Bureau of Economic
Research have been directed, in the main, toward the
improvement and analysis of the basic records of economic
life.An adequate foundation of economic facts is essential
to public administrators, to business men and to economists.
Yet the work of a research agency should not be confined
• to fact-finding.Itis proper that members of its staff
should explore the implications of their data, formulating
and testing hypotheses that interpret and unify the facts
of economics.
This paper by Dr. Eugen Altsclzul and Dr. Frederick
Strauss presents results secured in such a study.It is con-
cerned with the interpretation of recent agricultural ex-
perience, rather titan with the elaboration of the factual
record of that experience.Employing Census data and
other available material, the authors have advanced an
hypothesis concerning the relation of technical progress to
prolonged agricultural depressions of the type that has
been so conspicuous a feature of the post-War economic
situation.
This hypothesis presents in a new light the problems of
agricultural change and of adjustment to the process of
mechanization in agriculture.It should stimulate critical
study of the implications and possible consequences of the
extensive use of machinery in farming operations.Its
testing will call for careful appraisal of existing data and
for the improvement of these data in important fields.If
the main thesis of the authors is sound, it has an obvious
and highly important bearing on the formulation of public
policy in agriculture.The complete report of this in-
vestigation, which will appear in a forthcoming volume,
will contain a fuller account of the evidence on which the
authorsbase their hypothesis and more detailed analysis of
the relations between business cycles, long-run and short-
run fluctuations in agriculture.In the meantime tlzis pre-
liminary statement of the argument is presented in the
belief that itwill trove stimulating to students of the
problems facing American agriculture.
Dr. Eugen Altschul, the senior author of this mono-
graph, is the former head of the Frankfurter Gesellschaf:
fuer Konjunkturforschung and editoroftizeGerman
translation of the first volume of JJ/. C. Mitchell's Bus-
INESS CYCLES.Through the generosity of the Maurice
and Laura Falk Foundation the National Bureau was able
to bring him to i/se United States to make a study of agri-
cultural depressions and business cycles.Shortly after his
arrival in this country Dr. Altschul was invited to conduct
courses on monetary theory and business cycles at the Uni-
versity of .M'innesota.For the prosecution of his research
.work at the National Bureau, which he has carried on in
conjunction with his teaching duties, Dr. Altschul secured
i/se aid of Dr. Frederick Strauss, his former student at the
University of Frank fort and economist of the Reiclzs-
Kredit-Gesellschaft in Berlin.Since much of the work on
Dr. Altschul's investigation has now been completed, the
National Bureau has been able to release Dr. Strauss for
a study of the changing balance between agriculture and
industry, which the National Bureau is making in co-




ETWEEN the beginning of the nineteenth century and
the World War agriculture in the Western \Vorld
experienced two major depressions, both of long duration.
One followed the Napoleonic Wars, the other appeared in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.The fact that
these depressions lasted much longer than periods usually
associated with business cycles suggests that the long term
fluctuations in agriculture constitute a peculiar type of
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disturbance and adjustment.Though it is difficult to find
series adequately representing these long period disturb-
ances,the available data indicate that the agricultural
depression that started after the 'World 'War in the United
States belongs to the same category as the two major de-
pressions of the nineteenth century. The downward move-
ment or low level of such series as the value of farm real
estate, gross farm income and the ratio between the pur-
chasing power of per capita farm income and non-farm
income from 1920 to 1932 (Chart 1) provides evidence
of a long run disturbance in the United Stated.It is true
that in some years the declines were checked.Neverthe-
less, the period since 1920 appears homogeneous because,
as we shall see, the causes of the disturbance persisted
throughout.
Whatever the primary cause, lcng run depressions in
agriculture appear as a reaction to an accelerated expansion
in agricultural production, due to or in any case accom-
panied by a more or less sudden change in the technical
conditions of production.The visible impulse to such ex-
pansions, whIch should not be identified with the primary
cause, may come from different sources.Sometimes wars
give the stimulus to a sudden overexpansion.The Na-
poleonic Wars and the 'World War had apparently such
effects.Sometimes an accelerated industrial development
and a rapid growth in population stimulate a rapid in-
crease in agricultural production.This happened in the.
period preceding the agricultural depression of the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, when the cultivation of
large areas of virgin land led to a tremendous expansion in
grain production.
It is the combined effect of different factors that brings
about in a specific historical situation a long period de-
pression, but it is impossible satisfactorily to separate the
several factors at work or to determine their relative im-
portance.'We face these difficulties also in analyzing the
recent depression.Inthiscase, however, one feature
stands out from the rest, namely, rapid mechanization and
its consequences.
The aim of mechanization, like that of any technical im-
provement, is to reduce cost.In its realization agriculture
faces particular difficulties.Once mechanization has been
introduced on a large scale, the farmer has little choice in
selecting the size of his farm and his equipment.Median-
ization leads to an increase in output and a reduction in
cost.Therefore farmers not equally equipped with capital
can no longer compete with the more progressive farmers.
This does not, however, lead to the immediate withdrawal
from production of farmers who cannot reduce costs by
utilizing new methods of production.
This constitutes the first phase of the agricultural de-
pression, in which only the iess efficient farmer is affected
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whilethe farmer who can utilize new methods of produc-
tion gains differential profit or at least normal profit.The
cost advantages of the mechanized farms determine how
long the effects of falling prices can be compensated.Un-
tilthis point is reached both categories of farmers will
expand production: the more efficient because itis profit-
able, the marginal in order to meet cash expenses.The
process of elimination of marginal producers at this stage
differs from that in industry only in degree.But when
with expanding production the price fall persists, highly
mechanized farms begin to lose thek cost advantage.Un-
yielding overhead becomes a barrier to the adjustment of
cost to falling prices.The burden of overhead costs can
become so heavy that these farms may turn to less mechan-
ized technique.
Since the advantages of mechanized farms may tern-
'porarily disappear and the disadvantage of unmechartized
farms may at times be turned into relative advantages, the
elimination of marginal farmers does not present a con-
tinuous process.Before these farmers are wiped out they
will make every effort to compensate the effect of a de-
structive price decline by expanding production, particular-
ly if a shift to less disturbed branches is impossible or
highly restricted.The readjustment may therefore be re-
tarded for years.
Only a detailed analysis, which must be reserved for a
forthcoming book, can show to just what extent the
peculiarities of agriculture determine the process of adjust-
ment to new conditions of production.Here we can call
attention only to a few points.
The difficu'lties of adjusting the supply of agricultural
products to changing conditions of production and the lowTechnical Progress and Agricultural Depression 3
elasticity of demand for agricultural products together de-
termine the main course of the depression.The disturb-
ances resulting from sudden changes in the technique of
production are of long duration because they tend to cause
in the whole structure of the agricultural supply.
emanating from demand are in general of
shrun character.
Thus fluctuations in agriculture cover a great variety
of disturbances.They are complex and differ greatly
from branch to branch.Only with some limitations can
we speak about the situation in agriculture as a whole.
The process of adjustment to changed market conditions,
being affected by specific conditions of production and
by specific elasticities of demand for the individual agri-
cultural products, is different in different branches of agri-
culture.
In this Bulletin we discuss two leading agricultural
products, wheat and cotton.Wheat was chosen for two
principal reasons:(1)technical changes are more ad-
vanced in the production of wheat and their consequences
are more far-reaching than in any other branch of f arm-
ing, (2) wheat is one of the most important sources of
farm income, and its price influences greatly the prices of
other grains and of farm land, and so affects large agri-
cultural groups.Cotton was chosen because its analysis
reveals certain peculiarities that are in contrast to the dis-
turbances and fluctuations in wheat.Mechanization has
not played the same role in cotton farming that it has in
wheat production. The discussion of cotton brings out the
importance of a number of other factors that have influ-
enced recent agricultural developments in this country.It
should be noted, however, that although reference is made
to certain of these other factors, the present analysis does
not describe the agricultural depression in its totality; it is
limited to a characterization of its outstanding features
as a long run phenomenon.
We start with the analysis of mechanization as the most
characteristic factor of modern technical progress in agri-
culture. We then turn to some additional factors which
modified the influence of technical progress and which must
be taken into consideration if we want to understand the
peculiar effects and repercussions of technical change.
I THE ROLE OF MEcHANIZATION IN WHEAT FAJ&MINC
Arable farming,particularly wheat production, was
characterized during the. post-War period by a radical
in technique.The consequent expansion in pro-
resulted in (1) excess supply, (2) shifts in farm
production and organization.'\'Vheat does not tell, the
whole story of the agricultural depression, yet it reveals
with especial clarity the Outstanding characteristics of the
depression, namely, severity and long duration. We con-
sider first: (a) technical conditions of production; (b) ex-
pansion of production; (c) mechanization and its relation
to the size of farms; (d) changes in farm organization;
(e) implications and probable future development.2
a. Technical conditions of production
From the beginning of the twentieth centurythe out-
break of the World War American agriculture developed
fairly steadily.The continuous shifts in farm production
and organization did not greatly affect the structure of
American farming, since under the prevailing market con-
ditions all kinds of producers could exist.Though wheat
acreage and production were rising during the years im-
mediatelv'preceding the '\Var, the level of production was
still about the same as it had been in the decade 1900-09.
A western movement of wheat farming was noticeable.
We do not know whether the expansion in wheat acreage
might have continued in any event.The technical im-
provernent of the gasoline tractor and the combine would
have contributed to such expansion even if war had not
broken out, and would have led to major changes in farm
organization.As we shall show later, a large part of the
increase in mechanization and production occurred after
the WTar, when the specific war conditions no longer ex-
isted.The coincidence of improvements of farm machin-
ery and the rise in wheat prices during the 'War accelerated
the change in production methods. The price increase was
a strong stimulus to expansion of production, which in
turn would hardly have been possible without the use of
mechanical power unless acreage devoted to other farm
products had been curtailed.But for such a curtailment
there was scarcely any motive, for the prices of other farm
products were increasing simultaneously at similar rates.
Though expansion in wheat acreage was due partly to
temporary cultivation in sections that had previously been
converted from wheat production to other uses,3 the far
greater part seems been due to shifts into districts
formerly considered unsuitable for arable farming.That
the increased use of tractors and combines is closely related
to the expansion of wheat acreage seems to be the pre-
vailing opinion of experts.According to the Department
of Agriculture, "expanding wheat acreages...although
caused primarily by mechanical power, had been influenced
to a very marked degree by power equipment.Perhaps
the chief influencing factor of equipment was the combined
harvester-thresher".3 The importance of this factor is in-
dicated by the record of tractor production and sales in
the United States (Table 1).
'The effects of the World War can be evaluated only after dis-
entangling the basic tendencies in American agriculture before
and after the War.
'Cf. Joseph S. Davis, JVheat and ike AAA (Brookings Institution1
1935), p. 6.
'Cf. Yearbook of Agriculture, 1932, p. 419,4 National Bureau of Economic Research
MtNUFACTURED
1909 2,000 1916 27,819
1910 4,000 1917 49,504





1916 30,000 1924 96,639
'Figures for 1909-17 are for wheel and tracklaying types manu-
factured.Figures for 1916-27 are for the same types sold in the
United States; see Yearbook of .4gricu!lurc, 1930, p. 1040.Cf.
\V. N. Hurst and L. M. Church, Power and Machinery in .4gri-
culture, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pubi. No. 157,
April 1933, p. 31.Figures for 1935 and 1936 are from Alanu-
facture and Sale of Farm Equipment and Related Products, 1935,
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1936 and
1937.Figures for 1931 are the number manufactured minus ex-
pores.
1920-29 the sales of industrial tractors constituted only
16 per cent of total tractor sales (all types) in the United States
(based upon analysis of Census data made by H. L. Boyle of
the International Harvester Company).
Had the extension of acreage and production stimulated
by the War been made with the old production methods,
American wheat farming would hardly have undergone the
major changes actually experienced.To bring under cul-
tivation those areas which contributed most to the increase
in production required a revolutionary change in method.
Internal combustion engines had already been intro-
duced on farms in the first decade of the twentieth century.
Sooner or later they would have been perfected.It is
cult to say to what extent high prices for farm products and
shortage of farm labor hastened the perfection and introduc-
tion of the tractor.The fact that the light-is eight high-
speed gasoline tractor was introduced so rapidly between
1915 and 1920 is, however, significant.It facilitated a
development of the Great Plains that would not have been
possible with animal power.' Once the start with mechan-
ized, lower cost methods had been made in the sub-humid
districts, further application was to be expected, though
the motives differed greatly at different periods.During
the War, and in less degree from 1924 to 1928, the price
situation stimulated the mechanization of farms.After
the price collapse in 1920, wheat farmers found that only
by mechanized methods could costs be reduced to a point
where production became profitable.Thatis,wheat
'Cf. R. U. Blasingame, Relation of Mechanical Progress in Agri-
culture to Land Utilization and Land Policy, in General Condi-
tions and Tendencies Influencing the Nation's Land Require-
meats, Part I, Supplementary Report of the Land Planning Com-
nhitteetothe National Resources Board (Washington, D.C.,
1936), p. 39,
farmers mechanized production either in order to obtain
differential profits or to make production profitable at all.
The improvement of the tractor and the combined har-
vester-thresher made it possible to reduce costs, particu-
larly in the states that had increased production notably
during the According to the Census figures the
number of tractors in the eight most important Great
Plains states increased from 82,000 in 1919 to 274,000 in
1929.The combined harvester-thresher was introduced
even more rapidly.In Kansas, for instance, the number
of combines in operation increased from a few machines
in 1918 to 8,300 in 1926, and to about 20,000 in 1931.6
Similar increases are to be noted in other sub-humid wheat
producing states such as Montana, where in 19306 some
6,000 harvester-threshers were inuse.The number of
tractors used in Montana rose, between 1925 and 1930,
from 8,000 to 20,000.
b. Expansion of production
The primary consequence of this far-reaching change in
method was a rapid expansion of acreage and a correspond-
ing rise in production (Chart 2).Most striking was the
expansion in Montana, where wheat acreage continued a
sharp upward trend already marked beforethe \Var.
Acreage harvestedincreasedfrom1,005,000acresin
1910-14 to 2,528,000 acres in 1915-19, 3,361,000 acres in
1920-24, and 3,935,000 acres in 1925-29, with a peak of
4,419,000 in 1929.The production figures show clearly
that the increase was especially great after the War. The
highest pre-War level(1910-14) of 22,189,000 bushels
was surpassed by about one-half during the War and was
doubled during 1920-24, a peak being reached in 1927
with 81,713,000 bushels.
The leading wheat state, Kansas, rapidly increased its
acreage between 1910 and 1914.During the WTar acreage
was notfurther expanded, but rose greatlyin1919.
Though the level then reached was not maintained, in
1920-24 acreage was more than 40 per cent above. 1910-14.
Thereafter a further advance occurred, from 8,755,000
acres in 1925 to the record high of 13,623,000 acres in
1931.Production shows essentially the same features:
despite extreme fluctuations in yield the gradual rise to
the record level of 1928-31 is striking.
In five important winter wheat states(Kansas, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado) the rise was sim-
ilar.From 10.4 million acres in 1910, acreage increased
continuoush to 24.5 million in 1919.It declined from
1919 to 1925, but the level during 1920-25 was still about
50 per cent above the pre-War and over 15 per cent above
the War level.The subsequent rise was like that in Kansas.
In all these regions, with topographic and climatic con-
'Cf. Yearbook of .4griculture, 1932, p. 419.
'E. A. Starch, Farm Organization as Affected by. Mechanization;
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, Bull. 278, May 1933.
TABLE 1
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ditionssuitable for mechanized methods, acreage and pro-
duction attained new high levels between 1928 and 1931.
This record stands in sharp contrast to those areas that
couldnotintroducelargescalemechanized methods.
Though acreage and production in the latter areas were
increased during the War because of high prices, notable
decreases took place throughout the post-War period.
These opposing tendencies are clearly revealed by a com-
parison of selected counties in different areas.In 1,940
counties located in the eastern and southern sections of the
United States, acreage harvested declined 32 million acres
from 1919 to 1929; 1,130 counties, mostof them in the
Great Plains, reported an increase of 33 million acres.
Though the years to which these figures refer, and the
fact that they cover all kinds of crops, limit their signifi-
cance with respect to the general wheat situation, the di-
rection of the movement is clear.During the same decade
wheat acreage harvested decreased 20 per cent in the East
and South and increased 40 per cent in the Great Plains.
The reason for the increase in the Great Plains is largely
the superiority of mechanized methods, as 0. E. Baker
of the Department of Agriculture states.1The land, the
crops grown, and the large farms of the Great Plains are
particularly suited to power machinery.
The increase of acreage and production in states where
large scale mechanized methods could be applied, and de-
crease in sections that had mainly to use the older methods,
determined total wheat acreage and production inthe
United States.'Wheat acreage rose from 1910, with a
break in 1916-17, to a record high in 1919.The peak,
73.7 million acres in 1919, surpassed the pre-'War average
(1910-14))of50.3millionacres by nearly one-half.
Though in the immediate post-War years acreage declined
(except in1921) until 1925 (52.4 million acres), the
level as expressed in the five-year average for 1920-24 was
almost 20 per cent above that of 1910-14.The five-year
moving averages in Chart 3 show that acreage fluctuated
about the 1920-24 level until 1932, as did total produc-
tion.
The United States may have led in the application of
mechanized methods, but the effects of mechanization on
the expansion of wheat acreage and production were by no
means peculiar to this country.Acreage and production
increased, in Canada, Argentina and Australia as well.
Canada, for which figures on mechanization are available,
istypical.The use of tractor and combine apparently
started there some years later than in the United States.
During the War this factor seems to have been only of
minor significance.From 1921to1931, however, the
number of tractors on farms in the Canadian West in-
creased from 38,000 to 81,000. The number of combined
harvester-threshers rose rapidly, especially after 1925, over
3,500 being sold in each of the years 1928 and 1929.e
A remarkable feature of the Canadian situation is that
wheat production decreased sharply during the War and
started to rise only at its end.In 1918 and 1919 produc-
tion was still below the pre-War level.From then on,
with the exception of a break in1924, the trend was
steeply upward until 1928.The level during 1920-24
was more than 30 per cent above the War level of 1915-19,
and during the next five years production increased again
at about the same rate.Total production in Canada,
Argentina and Australia together (Charts 3 arid 4)is
7T/,e Future Need for Farm Land (Address, Iowa State College,
February 9, 1934), p. 22.
6A. Stewart, Tue Economy of llfachine Production in .4gricuiture
(Ottawa, 1932).6 National Bureau of Economic Research
Chart 4 gives an impression of the changes in the con-
tributions of the various groups of countries to total world
production (excluding Russia and China).The end of
the World War separated two periods of development.
European production (excluding Russia) declined sharply
from a high of 1,366 million bushels in 1911 to a low of
865 million bushels in 1917, or from a pre-War average
(1910-14) of 1,262 million bushels to the War average
(1915-19) of 979 million.Combined production of the
main exporting countries, United States, Canada, Argen-
tina and Australia, fell off sharply in 1916, then started to
rise, and in 1918 surpassed the 1914 level.Production
increased continuously, except during 1924 and 1925, until
1928.European production started its rise at the end of
the War and, if we disregard extreme crop fluctuations,
continued to the record level of 1933.World production
(excluding Russia and China) reached its peak of 3,995
million bushels in 1928, an increase of more than 40 per
cent over 1919.To avoid implications suggested by ac-
1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935
cidentalfactors in any one year, the five-year iow at the
close of the \Var may be compared with the five-year high
centering about 1930.From 1916-20 to 1928-32 world
production (excluding Russia and China) rose from 2,824
million to 3,826 million bushels, or 35 per cent.Of this
increase, 39 per cent was due to expansion of production
in the four main exporting states and 49 per cent to the
increase in European production (excluding Russia). The
sharp increase of European wheat production in a period
when the exporting countries continued to expand their
output contributed materially to the severity of the de-
pression.
Undoubtedly, these countries expanded their
because they expected the conditions existing during or
immediately after the War to continue. But after market
conditions had changed, the readjustment became extreme-
ly difficult owing to the very methods used in expanding
production.
c. Tktechanization and its relation to the size of farms
Large scale mechanized methods as utilized in the main
wheat producing districts of the United States and the
other exporting countries had a two-fold effect: (1) the
post-War level of acreage and production was attainin
a very short period, (2) the problems of adjustm
changed market conditions were rendered more difficult by
the very nature of mechanized production.
Falling grain prices placed pressure upon wheat farmers
(so far as they could not shift to other branches of agricul-
ture) to expand their production, in order to be able to
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characterizedby a sharp rise from 1919 to 1928, inter-
rupted only in 1924.The War level, 1915-19, was about
one-fourth above that of 1910-14; in each of the two fol-
lowing five-year periods the level rose more than one-fifth
(23 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively).Technical Progress and Agricultural Depression 7
most of the post-War period.Table 2 indicates to what
extent the disparity in the movement of certain cash ex-
penses and of wheat prices may increase the amount of
u-heat required to cover those expenses.
TABLE 2
TAXES PER FARM AND AMOUNT OF WHEAT REQUIRED
TO MEET TAX PAYMENTS1
PRICE OF BUSHELS OF ACRES OF
TAXES WHEAT WHEAT WHEAT
1919 $119.33 $2.18 54.7 2.7
1920 138.28 2.52 54.9 4.2
1927 162.S5 1.30 125.3 7.0
1928 164.26 1.50 109.5 9.5
1929 167.06 1.12 149.2 7.7
1930 165.66 0.80 207.1 11.6
1931 157.94 0.43 367.3 12.5
1932 118.46 0.38 311.7 15.2
'Fifty-/irs!.qnnual Station, Report, Ohio Agricultu rat Experiment
1933, p.97.The example refers to the number of bushels of
wheat and of crop acres required to meet taxes on an Ohio farm
of average size (98.1 acres).
There are, however, important differences in the possi-
bilities of readjustment to such changes in market condi-
tions between farms operating with older production meth-
ods and large scale mechanized farms.Non-mechanized
farms can more easily adjust their crops to the relative ad-
vantages of various farm products.But highly mechan-
ized wheat farms have in general no choice; they must
continue to grow wheat.Large scale farm machinery re-
quires a certain minimum acreage in order to be profitable.
Many cost analyses show that once a farm business is or-
ganized on the basis of a given investment in machinery,
curtailing takes away the cost advantages of
mechanization.This may be illustrated by the examples
cited in Table 3.The figures there given indicate use of
a 10-foot combine on 600 acres costs nine cents more per
acre than on 800 acres; on 400 acres costs are increased
one-fourth. Using a 16-foot combine on 1,200 acres would
reduce costs to $.99; costs per acre would increase 60 per
cent if acreage were curtailed to 400 acres, for instance.
TABLE3
CosT PER ACRE IN HARVESTING WHEAT WITH COMBINE HARVESTERS
FOR PLOTS OF DIFFERENT SIZE1
ACRES HARVESTED SIZE OF COMBINE











The figures quoted may be extreme, but they indicate
the dilemma that many farmers face, i.e., either to produce
big crops by fully utilizing their farm machinery or to
lose their cost advantages.Experts believe that mechan-
izedfarms, by taking advantage ofcost reduction by
acreage expansion, were able to maintain profits until about
1930-31.' At that time about one-third of the hard winter
wheat, one-fifth of the spring wheat and a smaller amount
of soft winter wheat were harvested with the combine."
The preceding statements do not mean, of course, that only
farmers using combines made profits, while wheat farmers
operating with old methods faced ruin.; or that all mechan-
ized farms could resist depression, and others could not.
Indebtedness, reserves, and numerous other items are im-
portant.Other things being equal, however, the cost ad-
vantages of large scale mechanized farms meant economic
superiority for this type of wheat farmer from 1920 until
about 1930.Consequently, we would expect that during
this period the farms less efficient inthis respect would
have been eliminated.This hypothesis will be examined
later.
Highly mechanized wheat farms do not retain their ad-
vantage under all market conditions.The nature of the.
costs implies that under certain conditions they may lose
it.The power to resist depression is highly affected by the
relation of cash income to cash outlays.Table 4, based on
'Cf. e.g., Yearbook of Agriculture, 1932, p. 415.
"See H. R. Tolley and A. P. Brodell, The Role of Machinery in
the Development of the Agriculture of the United States, U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics
(mimeographed report), 1930.
TABLE 4
CALCULATED RELATIVE RETURNS TO OPERATORS OW 200 ACRE
HORSE-POWER FARMS AND 500 ACRE TRACTOR-POWER FARMS
IN KANSAS AT VARIOUS PRICES FOR WHEAT1
Wheat at $1.00 per Bushel Horse FarmsTractor Farms
Value per acre of operator's share $7.25
Labor and machinery outlay' 2.74
Net value per acre 4.51
Total net for acreage operated902.00
JVheat at $.60 per Bushel
Value per acre of operator's share
Labor and machinery outlay'
Net value per acre
Total net for acreage operated
lVheat at perBushel
Valueper acre of operator's share
Labor and machinery outlay'
Net value per acre
Total net for acreage operated
'C. L. Holmes, Farm Production Costs
ical Farm Equipment, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau
of Agricultural Economics (mimeographed report), November
30, 1931.

































of Minnesota,Bull. 266, May 1930,
L. P. Basset, Cost of Combine Harvesting in Minnesota, p. 17.
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as Affected by Mechan-TABLES
CONCENTRATION OF CROPLAND, 1909-1934
CHANGESIN CROPACREAGE,2CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FARMS IN WHICH ACREAGE WAS HELD
FARMSOF
Lessthan100-174 175-259 260-499 500-9991000-4999 5000 acres
Total 100 acres acres acres acres acres acresand over
(acrrai7eflgurcsin thousands)
NORTH DAKOTA ACREAGE
1909 20455 66 2125 9064.2 6675
1919 24563 59 1309 111802 8871
1924 19877 65 1096 S83 8445 7252 2103 32
1929 21255 66 915 791 7786 8263 3375 58
1934 19237 91 1180 747 7370 6961 2831 58
CHANGES IN ACREAGE
1909-19 +4108 —7 —816 +21162 +2196
1924-29 +1378 +1 —181 —92 —659 +1011 +1272 +26
1929-34 —2018 +25 +265 —44 —416 —1302 —544 0
PERCENTAGECHANCE
1909-19 +20.1 —10.6 —38.4 +23.32 +32.9
1924-29 +6.9 +1.5 —16.5 —10.4- —7.8 +13.9 +60.5+81.3
1929-34 —9.5 +37-9 +29.0 —5.6 —5.3 —15.8 —16.1 0
SOUTH DAKOTA ACREAGE
1909 15327 170 2113 30652 3887
1919 18199 183 2005 90202 4439
1924 15793 203 1947 1706 6593 3808 1417 119
1929 17856 184 1860 1673 6818 4717 2435 170
1934 14646 179 1284 11-44 5877 3371 1762 130
CHANCESIN ACREAGE
1909-19 +2372 +13 —108 +9552 +552
1924-29 +2063 —19 —87 —33 +225 +909+1018 +51
1929-34 —3210 —5 +24 —229 —941 —1346 —673 —40
PERCENTAGE CHANGE -
1909-19 +15.0 +7.6 —5.1 +11.82 +14.2
1924-29 +13.1 —9.4 —4.5 —1.9 +3.4 +23.9 +71.8+42.9
1929-34 —180 —2.7 +l.3 —13.7 —13.8 —28.5 —27.6 —23.5
NEBRASKA ACREAGE
1909 24383 1048 5676 106342 3888
1919 23110 901 5586 104732 3042
1924 19810 720 4849 3452 5696 2569 1948 576
1929 21399 654 4603 3610 6287 3155 2465 625
1934 20430 664 4270 3296 5987 3097 2445 669
CHANGESIN ACREAGE
1909-19 —1273 —147 —90 _1612 —846
1924-29 +1589 —66 —246 +158 +591 +586 +517 +49
7929-34 —969 +10 —333 —314 —300 —53 —20 4-44
PERCENTAGECHANGE
1909-19 —5.2 —14.0 —1.6 _1.52 —21.8
1924-29 +8.0 —9.2 —5.1 +4.6 +10.4 +22.8 +26.5 +3.5
1929-34 —4.5 +1.5 —7.2 —8.7 —4.8 —1.8 —0.8 +7.0 -
KANSAS ACREAGE
1909 29904 2100 6889 138122 4527
1919 30601 1578 5890 144892 5281
1924 22382 1197 4372 3573 7716 3929 1474 120
1929 24-308 1009 3753 3336 8091 5428 2509 183
1934 24099 1130 3770 3125 7525 5299 3038 210
CHANCESIN ACREAGE
7909-19 4-697 —522 —999 +6772 +754
1924-29 +1926 —188 —619 —237 +375 +1499 +1035 +63
1929-34 —209 +121 +17 —211..—566..... —129 +529 4-27TABLE5(continued)
FARMS OF
Less than100-174 175-259 260-499 500-9991000-4999 5000 acres
Total 100 acres acres acres acres acres acresand over
fiQures in thousands)
KANSAS PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1909-19 +2.3 —24.9 —14.5 +4.9! ±16.7
1924-29 +8.6 —15.7 —14.2 —6.6 +4.9 +3S.2 +70.2+52.5
1929-34 —0.9 +12.0 +0.5 —6.3 —7.0 —2.4 +21.1+14.8
MONTANA ACREAGE
1909 3640 81 614 599
1919 11007 140 661 37772 3109
1924 6416 93 360 220 1850 2027 1445 423
1929 7841 97 303 197 1309 2353 2984 593
1934 7160 131 34.3 200 1230 2003 2649 600
CHANGESIN ACREAGE
1909-19 +7367 +59 +47 +28532 +2510
1924-29 +1425 +4 —57 —23 —541 +331 +1539 +170
1929-34 —681 +34 +40 +3 —79 —350 —335 +7
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1909-19 +202.4 +72.8 +7.7 +308.82 +419.0
1924-29 +22.2 +4.3 —15.8 —10.5 —29.2 ±16.3+106.5+40.2
1929-34 —S.7 +35.1 +13.2 +1.5 —6.0 —14.3 —11.2 +1.2
COLORADO ACREAGE
1909 4302 373 979 14572 55S
1919 7745 501 1022 29092 1734-
1921 5948 409 790 383 1853 1492 838 183
1929 6750 401 757 394 1760 1808 1445 186
2934 7242 430 845 407 1946 1911 1532 173
CHANGESIN ACREAGE
2909-29 +3443 +128 +14522 +1176
1924-29 +802 —8 —33 +11 —93 ±316 +607 +3
1929-34 +492 +29 +88 +13 ±186 ±103 +87 —13
PERCENTAGECHANGE
1909-19 +80.0 +34.3 +99.72 +210.8 +68.32
1924-29 +13.5 —2.0 —4.2 +2.9 —5.0 ±21.2 +72.4 +1.6
1929-31 +7-3 +7.2 +11.6 +3.3 +10.6 +5.7 +6.0 —7.0
WASHINGTON A CR E A GE
1909 6373 449 700 16932 1710 18212
1919 7129 694 580 16672 1867
1921 3263 551 310 184 567 783 790 78
1929 3659 547 292 175 508 824 1207 106
1934 3733 638 320 186 439 789 1212 98
CHANGESIN ACREAGE
1909-19 +756 +245 —120 ±157
1924-29 +396 —18 —9 —59 ±41 +417 +28
1929-34 +74 +91 +28 +11 —19 —35 +5 —8
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1909-19 +11.9 +54.6 —17.1 _1.52 +9.2
1924-29 ±12.1 —0.7 —5.8 —4.9 —10.4 ±5.2 +52.8+3S.9.
1929-34 +2.0 +16.6 +9.6 +6.3 —3.7 —4.2 +0.4 —7.5
SOURCE: 15th Census of the United States, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II; 14th Censusofthe United States,
1920, Agriculture, Vol. VI; U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1935, Vol. III.
1For 1909 and 1919 the figures relate to acreage in improved land, for 1924 and 1929 to crop acreage
harvested, and for 1934 to land used for crops (crop land harvested rhus crop failures),
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a study (begun in 1929) of 148 farms in Kansas, shows
calculated relative returns, at three prices for wheat, to
operators on 200 acre horsepower and 500 acre tractor-
power farms.
When wheat sells for $1.00 a bushel, the highly mech-
anized large farm yields a net return for labor, manage-
ment and capital more than double that of the smaller
farm operating with animal power. When the price falls
to 60 cents, the advantage of the mechanized farm de-
creases about one-half. A wheat price of 40 cents causes
the mechanized farm to lose, whereas the non-mechanized
farm has still a small gain.(Allowance must, of course,
be made for differing capital investments.)
The advantages of mechanized farms are thus limited,
while the disadvantages of non-mechanized farms are un-
der certain conditions turned into relative advantages. This
can retard the. elimination of marginal producers for many
years.
d. Changes in farmorganization
The course of the wheat depression is determined by the
length and nature of the process of adjustment, which in
turn is decisively influenced by the manner in which mar-
ginal farmers are eliminated.
The concentration of cl-op land and the elimination of
farms in the western falls into two periods: the
first from 1915 until about 1930, the second starting about
the time of the onset of the industrial depression and still
going on.Outstanding is the situation in Montana wihere
the number of wheat farmers decreased from 35,000 to
14,000 between 1915-17 and a period of rapid ex-
pansion in acreage and production.This example cannot
be generalized, but the tendency toward a concentration of
farms can be observed in all districts where mechanization
was important.The following evidence concerning all
kinds of farms strongly supports the conclusion that con-
centration occurred in wheat farming, although there is no
possibility of getting sufficient evidence of this tendency
for wheat
In the main wheat producing states, the crop land har-
vested by large farms showed with few exceptions the
highest, and, in some cases, the only increase (Table 5),
both from 1909 to 1919 and from 1924 to 1929.(The
record of Nebraska from 1909 to 1919 was exceptional;
acreage decreased inall size groups.)Comparisons be-
five winter wheat states (Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Colo-
rado and Nebraska) and the four important spring wheat states
(North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington) were
chosen for analysis.
of Agriculture, 1932, p. 4-19:"Investigationsmade in
Montana indicatethat. where 35,000 wheat farmers were op-
erating in 1915-17, there were only 14,000 in 1929 and they in
tvrn wsre handling a larger acreage,"
tween 1909-19 and 1924-29, and between 1919 and 1924,
are difficult because of modifications in the Census defini-
tion of crop land harvested and of improved land.In
general the tendency already marked in 1909-19 in these
states has unquestionably persisted.The period 1924-29
is more significant since it indicates that the trend toward
concentrationisindependentofthespecificconditions
created by the Wl-ar.Acreage increased in the wheat pro-
ducing states between 1909 and 1919 inall size groups
above 175 acres, the amount depending on differences in
farm organization and farm crops as well as on soil and
climatic conditions.The movement is related to the lim-
ited advance of mechanization during the \'Var, in all states
except Washington and Nebraska. The decrease in acreage
in the 100-174 acre group is striking during both 1909-19
and Acreage expansion during 1924-29 was due
chiefly to a concentration in size groups that were large
enough for mechanized methods, or in which acreage could
be increasedtoapoint where mechanization became
feasible.In most states the increase in crop land harvested
on farms above 500 acres equals or surpasses the total in-
crease.In some states, because of special conditions in-
fluencing the optimum size for mechanization, expansion
occurred in the 260 acre group upwards; in others, as
for example, Montana, Kansas, North Dakota, Washing-
ton, Colorado, the increase in the size groups above 500
acres far exceeded the total increase.The striking feature
of this period was the rapid concentration of crop acreage
harvested, partly because of the addition of smaller farms
to larger ones, partly because of the plowing of virgin
prairie and range lands, or of breaking new lands into new
farms.The decrease in aggregate acreage of medium size
farms was far greater than between 1909 and 1919.It
was general in the 100-174 acre group; in most states,
however, the 175-259 acre group also showed heavy de-
creases; acreage in the 260-499 acre group either decreased
sole source is the Census of Agriculture, which does not al-
low a separation of wheat farming.Its figures rather tend to
understate the concentration, which was probably more pro-
nounced in wheat farming than in farming as a whole.There
are other difficulties involved in the comparison of these Census
data: the census of 1930 was taken as of April1instead of
January 1, as were the censuses of 1920 and 1925.This modifi-
cation may affect the number of farms included in the three
censuses, but there is reason to believe that, ifso, the effect is
much the same in all size groups (with the probable exception
of the group 'less than 100 acres' which is of little interest in our
analysis).The influences of climatic and specific economic con-
ditions in the various Census years on the extent of crop acreage
harvested cannot be separated.Despite all these difficulties the
use of Census figures pertaining to changes in crop acreage and
in the number of farms is warranted in order to illustrate the
process of concentration of acreage and elimination of farms.
'41n Montana and Colorado, where acreage expanded in all size
groups, the increases are smallest in the 100-174 acre group.Technical Progress and Agricultural Depression 11
or the increases are negligible relatively to those in the
larger size groups.'5
Changes in the number of farms,1° by size groups, when
changes in production methods were most rapid, should
indicate which type of farm has been forced out ;17andit
may hint at the probable process of adjustment in agricul-
'—i tural production.Disregarding features due to specific
conditions in individual states, we can observe a marked
• tendency during farms of more than 500 acres
increased in number throughout the great wheat growing
area (Table 6) except in Washington, where only farms
above 1,000 acres increased.The decreases centered in
the 100-499 acre groups.The resistance of the various
medium size groups varied from period to period and
from state to state, with the exception of the 100-174 acre
group which decreased rapidly throughout.The general
conclusion from an analysis of the two decades in which
mechanization progressed rapidly, especially inthe later
period, is that farms that had the advantages of neither
small nor large size were eliminated.The changes be-
tw-een 1930 and 1935 as revealed in the 1935 Census can-
not aset be adequately evaluated.They indicate, how-
ever, that recent developments, during the most severe
part of the agricultural depression, are by no means clear-
cut.They do not indicate a continuation of the tendency
toward concentration which was so pronounced before the
industrial depression.If it turns out that the tendency
toward concentration was checked, the probable explanation
on changes in "land used for crops" between 1929 and
1934 are given in Table 5.On account of the severe drought of
1934, it was necessary to include 'crop failure' for 1934; i.e., 'crop
land harvested' in 1929 was compared with 'crop land harvested'
plus 'crop failure' in 1934.For 1929 'crop failure' was not given
for the various size groups.This limits the comparability of the
two sets of figures.Furthermore, the crop reduction program
of the AAA had different effects on the extent of crop acreage in
the various size groups in 1934.These are some of the reasons,
why we have not much confidence in a comparison of 1929 and
1934.Considering these limitations, we find strong indications
that the trend of the period 1919-29 has not been continued.
North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana show a decline in the
large size groups not less or more than in the medium size
groups.In Nebraska the decline is smaller in the size groups
500-999 and 3000-4999 than in the medium size groups, and a
small increase occurred in the size group 5000 acres and over.
In Kansas the large size groups seem to have continued their ex-
pansion.In Colorado the increase in the large size groups was
smaller than in the medium and small sizes; the group of 5000
acres and over decreased.
'The farm is here treated as an organizational unit, not as an
area of arable land.
"This means either that farms in such size groups could not sur-
vive or that they had to be enlarged (and thus fall in higher size
groups) in order to exist.
generalization for the earlier periods is more difficult though
the increases or relatively lower decreases occur in the larger
size groups.
will be that at the bottom of the depression mechanized
farms no longer enjoyed cost advantages.
The shifts in farm organization and production in the
euslern states are different from those in the Great Plains,
Mountain and Pacific states.The limitations upon the
application of large scale mechanized methods inthese
regions resulted mainly ina decrease in acreage during
1909-19 and 1924-29.It is hardly possible to determine
to what degree mechanization in the 'West is responsible
for the reduction in acreage and in the number of farms
in the East.It undoubtedly played a great role, though
the topographic and general farming conditions in the East
had already caused decreases in crop acreage prior to 1910.
Before analyzing the process of elimination in the eastern
states, itis worth pointing out that there is rarely a ten-
dency to a concentration of crop acreage (Table 7). From
1909 to 1919, when concentration was very great in the
western states, crop acreage on farms of more than 500
acres decreased in approximately the same proportion as in
the smaller size groups.From 1924 to 1929, farms above
260 acres in the New England, Middle Atlantic and East
North Central States increased in acreage; the smaller size
groups decreased.In no division, however, can the abso-
lute increases in crop acreage in these size groups be re-
garded as a significant tendency toward concentration, the
percentage of acreage in the large size groups being neg-
ligible.W
In the East no uniform tendency is evident in the pro-
cess of elimination (Table 8).Between 1910 and 1920
in New England and the Middle Atlantic States the num-
ber of farms decreased in all groups, less, however, in the
medium size groups (175-499 acres) than in the larger
size Only the 100-174 and 175-259 acre groups
in the East North Central States actually increased. The
reason may be that cost-reducing mechanized methods in
the East were best adapted to the medium size groups,
•owing to topographic, soil and climatic conditions, and to
the prevailing type of farm organization.Between 1925
and 1930 in all three divisions the number of farms in the
100-175 acre group (in New England and the Middle
Atlantic States even in the 175-259 acre group) dimin-
ished, while the larger size groups increased only slightly.
The development in the East was different from that in
the '\Vest and does not indicate a definite trend in farm-
ing
15Table 7 contains also changes in crop acreage between 1929
and 1934.In all three sections acreage increased inallsize
gioups without exception, reversing the trend observed between
1909 and 1929.We do not believe that this means a definite
change of the previous trend.
'°It is proper to note that there have undoubtedly been variations
in the of coverage of Census enumerations of farms, and
that these variations have been greater in certain size groups
than in others.John D, Black and R. H. Allen have discussed
(foo:nolen concluded on p. 11)TABLE 6
OF FARMS, 1910-1935,INIMPORTANT WHEAT PRODUCING STATES
FARMS OF
Less than 100-174 175-259 260499 500-9991000-4999 5000 acres
Total 100 acres acres acres acres acres acresand over
NORTH DAKOTA NUMBER OF FARMS
1910 74360 1886 23003 5345 29048 12662 24161
1920 77690 1736 11490 5589 364S9 18442 3853 91
1925 75970 2385 11144 5812 35093 17983 3503 50
1930 77975 2880 9641 5505 33450 21066 5365 68
1935 84606 5208 13499 5625 35133 19891 5174 76
CHANGEIN NUMBER OF FARMS
1910-20 +3330 —150 —11513 +244 +7441 +5780 +15281
1920-25 —1720 +649 —346 +223 —1396 —459 —350 —41
1925-30 +2005 +495 —1503 —307 —1643 +3083 +1S62 +18
1930-35 +6631 +2328 +3858 +120 +1683 —1175 —191 +8
PERCENTAGECHANCE
1910-20 —8.0 —50.0 +4.6 +25.6 +45.6 +63.2'
1920-25 —2.2 +37.4 —3.0 +4.0 —3.8 —2.5 —9.1 —45.1
1925-30 +2.6 +20.8 —13.5 —5.3 —4•7 +17.1 +53.2+36.0
7930-35 +8.5 +80.8 +40.0 +2.2 +5.0 —5.6 —3.6+11.8
SOUTH DAKOTA NUMBER OF FARMS
7910 77644 4335 28396 8230 24811 9698 21741
1920 74637 4140 -16463 9576 27767 11641 4788 262
7925 79537 5850 18715 10816 28776 1154-9 3651 180
7930 83157 6201 18034 10739 29559 13401 5003 220
1935 83303 7608 19819 9784 28678 11S64 5219 331
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FARMS
1910-20 —3007 —195 —11933 +1346 +2956 +191.3 +28761
1920-25 +4900 +1710 +2252 +124-0 +1009 —92 —1137 —82
1925-30 +3620 +351 —681 —77 +783 +1852 +1352 +40
1930-35 +146. +1407 +1785 —955 —881 —1537 +216 +111
PERCENTAGECHANGE
1910-20 —3.9 —4.5 —42.0 +16.4 +11.9 +20.0+132.31
1920-25 +6.6 +41.3 +13.7 +12.9 +3.6 —0.8 —23.7 —31.3
1925-30 +4.6 +6.0 3.6 —0.7 +2.7 +16,0 +37.0+22.2
1930-35 +0.2 +22.7 ±9-9 —8.9 —3.0 —11.5 +4.3+50.5
NEBRASKA NUMBER OF FARMS
1910 129678 21534 43916 20743 26490 13128 38671
7920 121417 18225 4-3157 21493 25884 9744 5500 414
1925 127734 20135 44199 22031 26500 9489 4958 422
1930 129458 20348 41731 23010 2S135 10260 5467 507
1935 133616 23921 41722 22543 28616 10490 5725 599
CFJAYGEIN NUMBER OF FARMS
1910-20 —5261 —3309 +750 —606 —3384+20471
1920-25 +3317 +1910 +1042 +538 +616 —255 —542
1925-30 +1724 +213 —2468 +979 +1635 +771 +509 +85
1930-35 ±4158 +3 573 —9 —467 +481 +230 +258 +92
PERCENTAGE CHANCE
1910-20 —4.1 —15.4 —1.7 +3.6 —2.3 —25.8 +52.91
7920-25 +2.7 +10.5 +2.4 +2.5 +2.4 —2.6 —9.9 +1.9
1925-30 +1.3 +1.1 —5.6 +4--4 +6.2 +8.1 +10.3+20.1
1930-35 +3.2 +17.6 * —2.0 +1.7 +2.2 +4.7+18.1
KANSAS NUMBER OF FARMS
1910 177841 44931 57789 26590 34696 10475 33601
1920 165286 35894 49044 26543 37504 12127 3942 232
1925 165879 39428 47338 25959 37171 12269 3517 197
1930 166042 39494 42920 254-81 38385 15055 4487 220
1935 174589 47323 4-4402 24955 37790 15025 4894 200
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FARMS
1910-20 —12555 —9037 —8745 —47 +2808 +1652 +814'
1920-25 +593 —1706 —584 —333 +142 —425 —35
7925-30 +163 +66 —4418 —478 +2786 +970 +23
7930-35 +8547 ±7829 +1482 —526 —595 —30 +407 —20TABLE6(continued)
FARMS OF































































































































1910-20 —0.2 +8.1 +15.8 +24.21
1920-25 —2.2 —0.9 +1.2 —10.8 —15.1
1925-30 —1.8 +22.7 +27.6+11.7
1930-35 —2.1 —1.6 —0.2 +9.1 —9.1
MONTANA UMBER OF FARMS .
1910 1566 6773 19991
1920 3412 23576 5106
1925 2610 16146 5363
1930 2496 11432 9545
1935 2570 11354 9641






















1910-20 —25.8 +85.7 +208.4+116.1l
1920-25 —11,4 —4.0 —13.9 +9.9 +3.7
1925-30 —2.3 +2.4 —13.5 +9.2 +49.5+42.9
1930-35 +7.2 —0.6 +4-9 +3.4 +4.5 +1.3
WASHINGTON N U M B E R 0 F F A R M S
1910 13884 3089 6126 3481 17261
1920 9958 3340 6297 4042 2187 88
1925 8522 2902 5003 3601 2018 132
1930 7774 2768 4464 3518 2567 172
1935 8308 2927 4446 3396 2661 208
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FARMS
—3926 +251 +171 +561 1910-20
• +5491
1920-25 —1436 —438 —1294 —441 —169 +44
1925-30 —743 —134 —539 —83 +549 +40
1930-35
.
.±534 +159 —18 .—122
.PERCENTAGECHANGE . .
+94 +36-
1910-20 .: —28.3 .+8.1 +2.8 +31.8', °:
1920-25 —14.4 —13.1 —20.5 —7.7±50.0




























































the United States, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II; Census
VI; U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1935, Vol. III.
-
. than 1/10 of 1 per cent.
of the United States,14 National Bureau of Economic Research
e. Implications and probable future development
The effects of elimination of farms and concentration
of acreage on the future adjustment of production are
rather complex.The process of elimination itself was by
no means uniform even during 1924-29.The available
statistics pertaining to the time of the deepest agricultural
depression suggest that the situation has changed greatly
since 1929..W7ith a further price decline, the advantages
of large scale mechanized farms became smaller and the
losses incurred forced many of them out of production. Ex-
perience during this time indicates that a continuous increase
in large scale mechanized farms, such as prevailed during
1919-29, meets difficulties that do not exist f or big industry.
These difficulties arise from peculiarities of agricultural pro-
duction and marketing. Retarded concentration in agricul-
ture must be partly attributed to the peculiar cost conditions
in large scale farming.Large scale mechanization usually
means specialization and very often a single crop.It is not
certain that, even in the long run, the cost advantages of
large scale operation can always counterbalance the ensuing
risk. Moreover, in the period of rapid mechanization some
areas were put under cultivation that in the long run are
not suitable for arable farming. Consequently, part of the
area that was cultivated during this period will have to
be turned back to range.It is likely that an even greater
part of this area cannot be used under the single crop
system, for the fertility of the soil can be maintained only
when crops are rotated.The droughts of 1934 and 1936
have shown how hazardous is cultivation on much of the
sub-humid area in the Great Plains.
It is difficult to define w'ith precision the future pros-
pects of this area for wheat farming.The careful report
of the National Resources emphasized as early as
concluded)
this matter, with particular reference to data for New England,
in 'The Counting of Farms in the United States', Journal of the
American Statistical Association, September 1937.They con-
cludethat considerable acreage wasomitted in 1924 and 1929,
and included in 1934.The chief discrepancies occurred in the
count of small farms, although the census for 1924 may have ex-
cludeda number of larger farms.These variations were not of
equal importance in all parts of country."The number of
farms involved in •the changes in enumeration behavior from
1920 to 1935 was a considerable percentage of the total number
only in the Northeastern states, in induserial counties scattered
over the country, and ina few scattered areas such as the
southern Appalachians, the cut-over regions of the Great Lake
states and some sections of the Pacific states"(p. 459).It is to
be noted that the analysis of changes in 'crop land harvested'
would not be seriously affected by these variations, since the
great bulk of harvested acreage is in farms of 260 acres or more.
Resources Board, A Report on National Planning and
Public Works in Relation to Natural Resources and Including
Land Use and Water', Resources, Part II, Report of the Land
Planning Committee, November 1934, p. 132.
1934 that the western edge of the Great Plains was unfit
for arabic farming and that part of the wheat acreage
in the western Dakotas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma
must be turned to other uses.In addition, according to
this report, between a million and a million and a half
acres of inferior land will have to be abando.ned and used
for summer fallowing or livestock if the adjustments in
farm organization necessary in these districts are made.
Thus further development similar to that of the last two
decades is limited.Even if adjustments improve the gen-
eral aspect of wheat farming in these areas, large scale
mechanization under such topographical and climatic con-
ditions will involve a great risk.
Despite all these limitations, it appears certain that in
the long run the mechanization of farming in the Great
Plains will proceed, though the optimum type of organ-
ization may well be the mechanized family farm of a size
somewhat smaller than that considered best in the decade
after the \'Var. The further development of farm niachin-
ery suitable for medium size farms and for more humid soil
may alter the trend of the last two decades.The rapid
mechanization since the \Var initiated changes in farm
organization that have not as yet run their course.Un-
doubtedly mechanization will progress, and where the ap-
plication of large machinery proves profitable a further
concentration of acreage will take place.But the advan-
tages that the perfecting of small scale machinery may
bring will increase the resistance of medium size farms, so
that even in the Great Plains area they may survive.
The rapid development of large scale mechanized meth-
ods in districts well suited to them has made possible the
attainment of a new level of output.The cost advan-
tage of highly mechanized farms until about 1931 resulted
in notable changes in wheat farming, concentration of
acreage and elimination of farms.But interruptions and
reverses, largely due to the peculiar nature of costs in
wheat farming, are likely to retard the adjustment process
in the future.
II THE ROLE OF MECHANIZATION IN COTTON FARMING
One might expect technological progress to have an in-
fluence on the production of cotton similar to the effect on
wheat production, but so far mechanization cannot be re-
garded as a major factor in the latest depression in cotton.
In the future cotton production may be dominated by the
application of mechanical devices and the consequences may
resemble those experienced in the wheat depression.How-
ever, many serious impediments will retard mechanization
of cotton production on a large scale.One of the most
important is the tenure system in the Old Cotton Belt.
The existence of this type of farming, is unfavorable to
mechanization, which can be carried out only upon aTechnical Progress and Agricultural Depression
TABLE7
CONCENTRATIdNOF CROP LAND, 1909-1934, IN EASTERN STATES
CHANGES IN CROP ACREAGE,1 CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FARMS IN WHICH ACREAGE WAS HELD:
FARMS OF
Less than 100-174 175-259 260-499
100 acres acres acres acres


























































































2592 1308 205 74
2426 1349 238 84
2577 1488 271 95
(thousandsof acres)
—50 —6
—166 +41 +30 +10




























































—4.5 ±2.5 —9.4 •—6.1
—16.7 .—5.7 +1.5 +12.9 +23.8 +8.0
+9.2 •+2.1 +2.3 +5.0 +12.8+19.4
United States,1930,Agriculture, Vol. II;14thCensus oftheUnited
States, 1920, Agriculture, Vol. VI; Abstract of the 14th Census, 1920, Agriculture; Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1919, 1929, 1931; U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1935, Vol. III.
'For 1909 and 1919 the figures relate to acreage in improved 1924 and 1929 to crop land
harvested, and for 1934 to land used for crops (crop land harvested plus crop failures).
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much larger farm, in a technical than that prevail-
ing in this region.Another serious hindrance is the to-
pography and climate of a wide area of the Cotton Belt.
Large sections are hilly and wooded.Farming is done in
small fields of irregular shape, which makes the use of
large machinery impossible.Because the humid climate
in wide sections of the Old Cotton Belt is cbnducivê to
weed growth, much hand labor is required in cultivation.
In addition, technical factors have prevented the mod-
ernization of a very important part of the production
process.Cotton picking, the process that requires most
labor, is still done almost exclusively by hand.Even in
those sections where.. the social system and natural con-
ditions do not impede extension of acreage and mechaniza-
tion, the farming system cannot be changed until a me-
chanical cotton picker has been Hence pro-
duction by large scale mechanized methods faces severe diffi-
culties.Either labor is short at picking and hoeing time
or else farms are burdened with a surplus of workers dur-
ing the entire year, because picking and hoeing require a
peak labor supply several times the minimum in the off
season.
Comparison of farms reporting tractors in Cot-
ton Belt with those in leading wheat producing states
shows that in 1930 about one farm in three used the tractor
for producing wheat as against one in fifty for producing
cotton.
During the decade 1920-30 the number of farms in the
Cotton Belt using tractors increased, but remained under
4 per cent of the total even in North the state
reporting the largest number of tractors.The higher per-
centage of tractors on farms in Texas and Oklahoma is
due mainly to wheat farms, which are highly mechanized
in this region.For cotton production in certain districts
of these states, however, the tractor is used more extensive-
ly than in the Old Cotton Belt.
The above figures suggest that the farming system in the
Old Cotton Belt has not as yet been materially affected by
mechanization.The problems similar to those growing
out of the mechanization of wheat farming do not yet
face cotton farmers.
The rapid expansion of acreage and production in parts
of Texas and Oklahoma, where conditions are fairly favor-
able to mechanization, seems to contradict this statement.
is not the decisive point, for we are considering only
changes in productive methods and their effects.This justifies
for our purpose the use of Census figures, which are based on
the technical unit rather than the unit of proprietorship, croppers
and tenants being counted as farmers.
great progress, the experimental pickers do not give
promise of wide use in the near future.
24Several farms under common ownership are counted separately;
cf. footnote 22.
In order to determine the influence of mechanization on
the expansion of production in these areas we compare
their situation with that of other states where production
was similarly expanded.
The acreage figures in themselves are surprising.The
sharp increase in Texas and Oklahoma occurred during
1919-24, with a 53 per cent advance in Texas and one of
47 per cent in Oklahoma.During 1924-29, however,
when mechanizationinwheat production and wheat
acreage in the Great Plains states rose most notably, cot-
ton acreage increased only 8 per cent in Oklahoma, and
decreased 1 per cent in Texas. At the same time, acreage
in some states of the Old Cotton Belt rose much more:
in Louisiana 35.5, and in Mississippi 34.6 per cent.This
may indicate that the acreage expansion in Texas and
Oklahoma between 1919 and 1924 was not so much a reL
suitof the introduction of mechanized methods as of
favorable cottonprices(especiallyincomparison with
cattle prices).This favorable condition followed a re-
duction of acreage and production, particularly in Georgia
and South Carolina, on account of the boll-weevil damage.
Itisa notable fact, however, that acreage increases in
Texas and Oklahoma during 1919-24 (7,100,000 acres)
were more than double the acreage decreases in Georgia
and South Carolina (2,650,000 acres).On the other
hand, if the expansion of acreage in 1919-24 was due to
mechanization, itis difficult to understand why mechan-
ization was not carried further, as it was in wheat.If
mechanization is advantageous—and the price situation
was not unfavorable for mechanized farms—we would ex-
pect it to progress; we would also expect that acreage
would expand further in the following period, unless the
totalfigures mean that acreage expansion incounties
suited to mechanized methods was approximately counter-
balanced by decreases unsuited to mechanization.
It is therefore not sufficient to analyze cotton production
by states.In order to gauge the role of technical progress
we must analyze production in those counties which ex-
panded their acreage substantially and in others where
acreage harvested declined for reasons other than crop
failures.
The principal questions to be raised in respect of mech-
anization in cotton farming are: (1) Did mechanization
play a determining role in the expansion of acreage and
production of cotton?(2)If there were shifts in size
groups and consequently in the farming system, were they
caused by mechanization?
Texas and Oklahoma on the one hand, and Mississippi
on the other, may be regarded as representative. We have
selected for our analysis in these three states the counties
showing sharp increases or decreases of cotton acreage in
both periods, 1919-24 and 1924-29, or. an increase in theTechnical Progress and Agricultural Depression 17
Total
TABLE8
E1.IsiLNATJ0N OF FARSIS, 1910-1935, IN EASTERN STATES
FAR MS OF
Less than 100-17-1- 175-259 260-499





























































































1910 468379 289996 123756 37656 14654 469
1920 425147 256540 116009 36009 14428 425
1925 418868 263408 108546 32548 12665 288
7930 357603 210261 98813 32186 13744 333
1935 397684 248399 100066 32884 14256 357
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FARMS
1910-20 —43232 —33456 —7747 —1647 —226 —112 —44
1920-25 —6279 +6868 —7463 —3461 —1763 —323 —137
1925-30 —61265 —52547 —9733 —362 +1079 +253 +45




—11.5 —6.3 —4.4- —1.5 —6.1 —9.4
1920-25 —1.5. +2.7 . —6.4 —9.6 —12.2 —18.6—32.2
1925-30 —14.6 —19.9 —9.0 —1.1 +8.5 +17.9+15.6
1930-35 +11.2 +17.8 +1.3 +2.2 +3.7 +7.2
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
NUMBER. OF FARMS
1910 1123489 646387 315607 107229 48356 5147 763
1920 1084744 598194 325390 108629 46860 4912 759
1925 1051572 584385 311562 104801 45703 4472 643
1930 966502 498409 301247 109222 51631 5301 692
2'935 1083687 600312 309713 112953 54220 5735 754
1910-20 —38745




1920-25 —33172 —13209 —13822 —3228 —1157 —440 —116
1925-30 —85070 —85976 —10321 +4421 +5928 +229 +4-9





SOURCE15th Census of the
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
—7.5 +3.1 +1.3 —3.1 —4.6 —0.5
—2.3 —4.2 —3.5 —2.5 —9.0 —15.3
• —14.7 —3.3. +4.2 +13.0 +7.6
• +20.4 +2.8 +3.4 +5.0 +8.2 +9.0
United States, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II;14th Census of the United
States, 1920, Agriculture, Vol. VI; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1924; U. S. Census of


















first period and a decrease in the second.'We have chosen
only those counties in which a major fraction of the acreage
was planted in cotton.This selection facilitates the analy-
sis since the data are not disturbed by the influence of
other farm products.In most of the counties studied the
percentage of crop lan'd harvested which is in cotton farms
is over 90.Thus the results become fairly conclusive.
The analysis was restricted to a few features characteristic
of productive methods and farm organization. An attempt
was made to determine in what size brackets and under
what technical conditions cotton acreage increased.Be-
sides breaking the acreage down by size of farmm Table 11
shows the total number of cotton farms and of those over
175 acres, to bring into prominence the number of farms
that are assumed to be technically in a position to mechan-
ize production. As a measure of the degree of mechaniza-
tion, the number of farms reporting tractors in each county
is given.In estimating the number of cotton farms using
tractors we determined the percentage relation of the value
of implements and machinery on cotton farms to the total
value of such implements and machinery on all farms in
each county studied. The total number of farms reporting
tractors in each county was then multiplied by this per-
centage, to yield the estimates in Table 10.
Table 11 contains three groups of counties divided ac-
cording to the apparent causes of increase in production.
The first group is composed of counties that have large
farms in which a definite influence of mechanization on the
expansion of acreage can be assumed.The second group
contains counties in areas where topographic and climatic
conditions make large acreage and mechanization possible
division into size' groups is available only for 1924-29.As
will be shown, thislimitation does not seriously impede the
analysis as the data for this period are sufficient to clarify the
pointin question.
TABLE9
FARMSREPORTING TRACTORS IN LEADING CorroN
AND \VHEAT PRODUCiNG STATES
1920 1925
(percentage of
but where, despite the existence of large farms, the increase
in cotton acreage is obviously not due to mechanization. In
1930the third group the increases are more or less independent of
all farms) mechanization and size of farms, the expansion in acreage
15.2 20.9 43.8having largely occurred on farms that are technically not
16.3 20.6 37.2 in a position to apply mechanized methods.
11.9 32.5 360
.Thefirst group is particularly significant because of the
9.8 17.2 possibility of mechanization rather than because of any'
3.0 5.0 11.4role it plays at present.Nueces, San Patricio, Tiliman,
1.9 3.2 6.4Washita and Jackson counties prove that under certain
conditions the cultivation of large cotton acreage with the
0.8 2.7 use' of mechanized methods has advantages, although cot-
0.7 ton picking requires a large amount of human labor.This
07 2:1 grouphas as yet slight importance; its output constitutes
0.6 1.5 2.0only a small percentage of total cotton production and
0.6 1.2 1.8 acreage increases in mechanized cotton farms in this group
0.3 1.0 1.7 have played only a minor role in the total increases.Ex-
0.2 0.7 1.5 pansion of acreage and production thus took place in coun-
ties where new as well as old methods were used. Ivlechan-
ization in cotton played but a minor role as compared to
its influence on the expansion of wheat acreage.Further,
the expansion in acreage of mechanized cotton farms did
not cause a reduction of acreage in small farms.
The second group of counties is most characteristic of
production methods and the development of cotton acreage
in the new cotton areas of southwestern Oklahoma and
Texas.Many cotton experts stress the fact that those
areas where cotton production in larger tracts is possible,
independent of the use of the tractor, have cost advantages
over districts where the social and topographical conditions
compel cotton farming in small We cannot tell
as yet whether these cost advantages over the older sections
of the Cotton Belt can be maintained in the long run.it
seems,however, that despite climatic hazards, these new
districts will expand acreage.According to Department
of Agriculture estimates, cotton acreage in the sub-humid
ZOne may,of course, consider the useof larger equipment
(without the use of tractors) as a form of mechanization.
TABLE 10
CorroNACREAGE HARVESTED IN THE MOST IMPORTANT












Tennessee . 761 9301,045
SOURCE: TheWorld Cotton Situation, Part
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TABLE11
CorroxPRODUCTION AND PRODUCTION METHODS IN TYPICAL Con-ox COUNTIES OF OKLAHOMA TEXAS,1919-1929
PERCENTAGE
CROP LAND HARVESTED OF
IN FARMS OF N UMBER OF COn-ON FARMS ALL FARMS
COTFON Under175175-259 260 acres 175 acresReportingREPORTING
COUNTY YEAR ACREAGE TOTAL acres acresand over TOTALand overtractors TRACTORS
(thousands of acres) (est:mated)
Group I
Nueces, Texas 1919 118
95%' 1924 164- 185 93 29 72
1929 254 298 98 44 145 1,723 553 710 38
San Patricia, Texas1919 60
90% 1924 102 123 58 19 46
1929 155 179 66 27 S6 1,382 377 460 30
Tillman, OkIa. 1919 93
80% 1924 166 293 195 29 70
1929 229 355 163 4-1- 147 2,210 621 670 30
Washita, OkIa. 1919 38
75% 1924 117 34-1 215 52 74
1929 220 417 255 6S 94 3,541 537 620 20
Jackson, OkIa. 1919 118
93% 1924 182 257 187 27 43
1929 24-4 329 192 45 94 2,590 610 330 13
GroupII
Childress,Texas 1919
95% 1924 92 143 73 24 46
1929 135 183 76 31 76 1,237 4S1 75 6
Cottle,Texas 1919 45
93% 1924 81 111 48 22 4-1
1929 133 166 '52 32 81 980 456 60 6
Collingworth, Texas1919 50
90% 1924 95 176 97 28 51
1929 162 236 112 41 83 1,7S1 568 65 4
Hall, Texas 1919 65
97% 1924 114 176 107 33 36
1929 158 213 111 43 58 1,752 467 10 4
Navarro, Texas 1919 261
98% 1924 301 382 316 40 26
1929 317 411 318 50 43 6,023 519 135 2 -
Harmon,Ok-la. 1919 55
93% 1924 92 161 104. 26 31
1929 135 197 116 32 48 1,580 406 110 7
Group111
Beckham,OkIa. 1919 54
92% 1924 88 210 132 30 47
1929 177 274 190 33 49 2,751 511 210 8
Caddo, OkIa. 1919 58
76% 1924 153 394 274 49 70
1929 226 432 314 47 70 4,533 489 320 8
Greer, OkIa. 1919 60
93% 1924 96 165 107 22 36
1929 155 219 133 33 51 2147 468 220 10
Falls, Texas 1919 188
97% 1924 217 284- 254 15 15
1929 241 312 270 21 22 5,584 225 200 4
sOURCE: 15th Census of the United States, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. 11 and III.
'The below each county name indicates the percentage relation of acreage harvested in cotton farms in 1929 to total acreage
in all farms.20 National Bureau of Economic Research
sections of Texas and Oklahoma suitable for extensive
methods constituted about 20 per cent oftotal cotton
acreage in the United States during Production
in this area was about 16 per cent of total American cotton
production.Natural conditions in this area lend them-
selves to extensive cotton production without tractors. De-
partment of Agriculture investigations show that the most
common work unit in the new cotton districtsis 2-row
equipment with a 4 to 6 horse team.In the other districts
the unit is one man and one horse with 3/2rowequipment.
The differences are largely a result of differences in climatic
conditions and in topography.This explains thefact
that in many counties of southwestern Texas and Okla-
homa more and more cotton has been produced on large
farms without tractors.According to all indications the
bulk of the increase in acreage, particularly between 1924
and 1929, was on larger farms that took advantage of
topography and climate without using motive power.
The statistics referring to such counties as Childress,
Cottle, Collingsworth, Hall, Navarro, Harmon (Group
II) show that only a small percentage of farms use trac-
tors, though cotton acreage in large farms rose rapidly.
In the group of farms of 175 acres or more there were,
in Collingsworth county, only 65 tractor farms in a total
of 568; in Childress county there were only 75tractor
farms in a total of 481.These relations show the situation
clearly.Moreover, it is to be noted that increases in the
S. Department of Agriculture, The World Cotton Situation,
Part II, p .22.
acreage of the larger farms were not accompanied by a re-
duction in acreage of the smaller farms, as in wheat.In-
stead, there are many counties in the same area (Group
III) where, despite the existence of mechanized or large
farms, the bulk of the acreage increases occurred in the
smaller size groups (for example, in Beckham, Caddo,
Greer and Falls).
The sharpest contrast to the situation in wheat is found
in those states in which production was increased notably
in the small size groups, with no concentration of owner-
ship.The conditions in Mississippi are typical.Table 12
shows the situation in several counties.Itis significant
that acreage in the group of farms under 100 acres in-
creased much more rapidly between 1924 and 1929 than
during the preceding five years.The situation in these
counties is so obvious that the table can be simplified by
giving merely the cotton acreage harvested, the percentage
of 'tractorized' farms, total crop land harvested and crop
land harvested in farms of more than 100 acres.In no
case did the development in the larger size groups de-
termine the total cotton acreage harvested.
The preceding analysis has a definite bearing on some
questions that are of importance in relation to the role
of mechanization in cotton farming.The necessity of se-
lecting typical counties makes it impossible for us to get
evidence on the extent of mechanization in total cotton
production.But the fact that in districts suited for highly
mechanized methods the use of the tractor is by no means
general indicates that mechanization even there is still in
TAaLE 12
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216 233 22 9 20 35
224 265 27 231 18 11 36 42
287 1.2 331 30 286 28 13 30 43
41 82 71 53 27 4
53 103 12 86 61 39 16 4
72 0.9 120 12 102 67 40 25 1
109 126 16 6
8
20 41
125 151 10 143 16 17 41
172 1.2 217 15 193 17 6 20 2
71 84 8 5 5 22
66 84 10 69 10 8 - 16 51
100 0.9 116 10 106 14 11:: 14 26
152 184 15 8 15 36
192 222 34 193 15 . 6 23 40
286 0.9 329 27 281 25 8 18 46
SOURCE: 15th Censusofthe United States, 1.930, Agriculture, Vol. II and III.
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its beginning.This becomes more evident if we observe
the effect of mechanization on the various types of cotton
farm, both in this area and in the Old Cotton Belt.
In contrast to wheat, small cotton farmers were not
eliminatedto great extent, eveninthose counties
where conditions are favorable to mechanization and larger
acreage.In districts where the expansion of acreage in the
decade 1919-29 occurred without mechanized methods no
tendency towards concentration of farms appears.Acreage
in small farms increased much more than in larger farms
(above 100 acres).In the new wheat areas, however,
the medium size farms, which correspond to the smaller
size groups in the Cotton Belt, were in large degree elim-
inated.The figures showing a relative stability of the
small size groups do not, of course, indicate the prosperity
• of this type of cotton farmer.
• These observations refer only to the period here an-
alyzed.Technicalprogress may hastenexpansionof
acreage in the new Cotton districts and result in severe
dislocations inthe farming system of the Old Cotton
Belt.The mere fact that a tendency toward increasing
acreage and production in the newer cotton areas can be
observed indicates the direction of possible further shifts in
cotton production in the United States.But so far, the
increase in acreage itt larger cotton farms does not seem
to have greatly affected the adjustment process in cotton
farming.Even if we assume that the analysis understated
the importance of areas in which mechanization and large
scale cotton farming took place,itiscertain that the
• samples chosen should have shown the effect of a process of
concentrationonthevarioustypesofcottonfarm.
Mechanization, with increasing production, in larger farms
has not as yet resulted in dislocations either in the areas
in which it took place or in areas that continued to grow
cotton in small tracts.Thus, the depression in cotton
cannot be explained by mechanization and its consequences.
PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Production of cotton was not expanded in the United
States during the World War. Average production dur-
ing the five years 1915-19 was 20 per cent lower than in
19 10-14 (11,466,000 as against 14,254,000 bales). Owing
chiefly to boIl-w-eevil damage, particularly during 1920-23,
average annual production in 1920-24 declined another 4
per cent, with a low record of 7,945,000 bales in 1921.
During the general price decline of 1920-21 the price
of cotton fell from a peak of 42 cents per pound in April
1920to 12 cents in March 1921. The small crops of the
boll-weevilyearschangedthepricesituationrapidly,
raising the price of cotton fairly continuously to 36 cents
per pound in December The favorable price may
however, was not the only cause; improved business con-
ditions also played a part.
be regarded as the main incentive for expanding acreage and
production in the following years, particularly in those dis-
tricts of Texas and Oklahoma that remained unaffected
by the weevil.The volume of 1914 production was not
regained until 1925, whets a crop of 16,105,000 bales was
harvested as against 16,112,000 in 1914.The high aver-
age yield of 192.8 pounds per acre in 1926 (1921: 132.5)
resulted in a crop of 17,978,000 bales.Boll-weevil dam-
age and the triumph over it determined in large degree
the course of cotton acreage and production during and
after the W7ar.In contrast to wheat the level of produc-
tion did not rise (Chart 5).
CHART5
COTTON ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION
UNITED STATES
O—o---o---Q5yea'
PRODUCTION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
In foreign countries also cotton production decreased
during the War, total production (excluding China) aver-
aging 6.6 million bales in 1915-19 as against 7.3 million
bales in 1910-14. The 1914 level was not until
1924.As in America, the deficient years 1920 and 1921.
and the favorable cotton price led to expansion in the fol-
lowing years.Between 1921 and 1925 foreign cotton
pooduction (including China) rose from 7.5 to 11.8 mil-
lion bales; average foreign production in1925-20 ex-
ceeded pre-WTar production(19 10-14)by 29 per cent
(Chart 6).
The post-War level of world cotton production did not,
except in 1925, 1926 and 1931, exceed 1914
movement of world cotton production, including China, is






luding China and 1x:
1910 1915 1920 925 930 1935
Thedifference between wheat and cotton production is fun-
damental: in foreign countries even more in the United
States cotton is grown almost exclusively on small farms
that do not use mechanized methods.noThis fact influences
the possibility of adjusting production to market conditions.
Rapid expansion is somewhat limited, while reductions in
distribution according to size of farms in Egypt illustrates
the organization of cotton farms outside the United States.The
small size of the farming unit abroad is even more clearly re-
vealed if we compare it with the size of farms in the wheat dis-
tricts of the United States and Canada.
LANDOWNERS AND DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY SIZE OF HoLDING,
EGYPT, 1931
AVERAGE
SIZE OF OWNERS AREA HOLDING
HOLDING Per Per PER OWNER
(acres) Numbercent Acrescent(acres)
Less than1 1,529,64468.2 605,70710.1 0.4
1—5 554,55024.7 1,213,52120.3 2.2..
5.1—10 84,351 3.8 593,049 9.9 7.0
10.1—21 40,377 1.8 529,535 8.8 13.1
21.1—31 '12,093 0.5 303,480 5.0 25.1
31.1—52 9,4040.4 374,310 6.2 39.9
Over 52 12,708 0.6 2,390,41839.7 1SI.1
Total 2,243,127100.0 6,015,521100.0 2.7




in Egypt, U. S.
October, 1934.
Department
acreage and production (if necessary) are being and can be
made more easily than in wheat, particularly in the West
where no alternative crop is prevalent.
III THE ROLE OF OTHER FACTORS IN THE
AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION,
A. OTHER FACTORS IN THE WHEAT DEPRESSION
We have found that mechanization, by greatly influ-
encing the supply of wheat, determined to a great extent
the process of adjustment and therefore the course of the
wheat depression.The impact of mechanization and its
economic consequences were so heavy that to them may be
attributed in large measure the long depression in wheat
farming.It is, however, difficult to illustrate adequately
the situation in wheat by statistical series indicating the
prosperity of wheat farmers.The nearest approximation
appears to be the movement of the aggregate farm value of
wheat, deflated by prices farmers paid.The statistical in-
adequacies of this series allow only a limited use of it, but
its movement seems to confirm the expectations derived
from the analysis of the adjustment processin wheat f arm-
ing, namely that wheat farming must have been depressed
throughout the pnst-\Var period, except for an improve-
ment during 1924-27.If we use as a standard the income
level of 1910-14, the series indicates that this level was ex-
ceeded only between 1924 and 1927, and that from 1920 on,
except in these years, income was lower than before the
War (Chart 7).
CHART7
AGGREGATE FARM VALUE OF WHEAT
(dellaled by paid by farmers' indexi
1910—14=100
Although thedepressioninwheatisprimarilyde-
termin.d by technical progress, additional factors must be
taken into account to make the picture more complete and
the influence of mechanization more understandable.
1. Indebtedness and price fluctuations
This is not the place to evaluate the extent to which the
wheat situation has been aggravated and accentuated by
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impossible to ignore one important consequence of the
WTar;namely,theinflationarytendenciesprevailing
throughout the 'War and part of the post-War period.
The general rise in prices undoubtedly had marked effects
on the entire farm situation.The sharp increase in farm
• prices and net income of farmers was accompanied by a
steep rise in real estate values.The average price per acre
of farm land in the United States rose from $39.60 in
1910 to $69.38 in1920.tmRising prices and rising real
estate values greatly stimulated the transfer of farms, and
led to an increase in the total farm mortgage debt.Be-
tween 1910 and 1920 this debt rose from 3,320 to 7,858
million dollars, or 136.6 per cent.Though the establish-
ment of a causal connection is not fully warranted, it seems
significant that the rise was particularly heavy in districts
that introduced new methods of production.In Montana,
notably, the mortgage debt in 1920 was nearly eight times
as high as in 1910, increasing from 20 to 155 million dol-
lard.Indebtedness in the eight states rose 379
per cent, in the Pacific states 213 per cent, and in the MTest
North Central states 147 per cent.In contrast, mortgage
debts in New England and in the Middle Atlantic states,
where methods were not changed greatly, increased only
59 and 41 per cent.
Undoubtedly farm land and improvements purchased at
very high prices, when income prospects were favorable,
became a heavy burden when prices of farm products
dropped.Changes in the general price level were the more
burdensome since the average mortgaged farm remained
under mortgage 25-30 years or even longer.Many farm
mortgages were incurred when interest rates were especial-
ly high, not only during the War but also in 1920-2 1 and
1923-24.As a result these fixed charges absorbed an ex-
tremely high percentage of farmers' incomes.In 1925,
when 36 per cent of all farms reported mortgages (which,.
in the aggregate, constituted less than 20 per cent of the
total value of land and buildings), nearly one-third of the
net return from all farm land and buildings in the United
States was required to meet the charges for mortgage debts
on Payments of interest on farm mortgage debts
(at 5.5 per cent) in Minnesota constituted 5 per cent of
gross sales in 1910, 7 per cent in 1920, 8 per cent in 1925,
9 per cent in 1930, and no less than 16 per cent in
The influence of this factor cannot be separated from
the effects of other forces.There can be, however, no
doubt that the disparity between fixed debt service and re-
duced income severely aggravated the situation of farmers.
tmCf. David L. Wickens, Farm-mortgage Credit, U. S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Technical Bull. 288, p.5.
ibid., pp. 3, 62.
tmCf. E. C. Johnson, Farm Mortgage Foreclosures in Minnesota,
University of Minnesota, Agricultural Experiment Station, Bull.
p. 2.
Between 1920 and 1923, 8.5 per cent of all farms were
foreclosed or turned over to creditors, and between 1926
and 1932, 17.6 per cent were sold for delinquent taxes,
mortgage foreclosures, Even in 1928, when the farm
situation was better than in most post-War years, 4.9 per
cent of all mortgaged farms were foreclosed.Thus, there
seems good evidence that fixed costs for debt service in a
period of changes in the price level contributed heavily
to the difficulties of adjusting farm production.tmFarmers
who specialized in one crop, such as wheat, were worse
off than those whose farming was diversified.We can-
not measure the extent to which the elimination of certain
types of farm has' been affected by difficulties resulting
from high debt service.No adequate statistics are avail-
able that would make it possible to classify indebtedness
according to size of farm.
2. Foreign demand for wheat
WTithin a short time after the outbreak of the World
W'ar, the new world had to supply a great part of the
normal import needs of European countries formerly sup-
plied by Russia and. the Danube Basin. .Inaddition, the
chief wheat importing countries had to curtail their do-
mestic production.This situation accelerated the intro-
duction of large scale machinery in the wheat exporting
countries, especially the United and consequently
speeded up the expansion of acreage and production.The
resulting increase in supply was disposed of by greatly in-
creased exports to Europe.Credits to the foreign importer
facilitated the disposal of the large wheat crops.But this
market for increased North American production was de-
pendent upon an emergency that was not likely to con-
tinue when peace returned.The Wartime financing con-
tinued to keep European purchasing power large through
1919.For a short while thereafter commercial export
credits could maintain European purchasing power for
American farm products.When, however, monetary and
general economic disturbances in Europe set in, the export
channels suddenly became glutted.The break in farm
prices in the middle of 1920 was due to the economic and
monetary disturbances in Europe rather than to produc-
tion changes during the WTar, for European production
31Cf. The Farm Debt Problem, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., House Docu-
ment No. 9, 1933, p. 27.
35The argument advanced in connection with therelation of
farm taxes and output also holds true here.
a development might have occurred even without the War.
The pre-War trend toward diversification of production in the
United States was not favorable to a rapid introduction of large
scale machinery.However, competition of other overseas coun-
tries, particularly in wheat, was quite strong.This situation
would, in any event, have made it necessary to reduce costs in
the United States by a shift to mechanized production in order to
meet the competition of Canada and Argentina.24 National Bureau of Economic Research
even in 1920 was still about 30 per cent below the pre-
War level, and world supply as a whole had just regained
this level.The situation was gradually eased with the
return of stable conditions in Europe and with tbe increas-
ing influx of American capital, which for the time being
made it possible for European countries to continue to take
much of the surplus production of the new world.But,
the surplus producing countries were not able to reverse
the trend of
For some time after the \Var demand for these sur-
plusesstillexisted, although distribution was hampered
by unstable conditions in Europe.As the import needs of
the old world decreased with increased domestic produc-
tion stimulated by tariffs, the market situation gradually
became less favorable for North American wheat. The in-
creasing difficulties in adjusting the balances of payments
of the debtor countries contributed to dislocations in de-
mand: the balances of payments of importers of farm
products, notably Germany, necessitated large exports of
manufactured products in exchange for agricultural food-
stuffs and raw materials.The shift of the United States
from a pre-War debtor to a post-War creditor position
and the increase in American tariffs aggravated foreign
trade conditions for agriculture and thus added to the diffi-
culty in disposing of farm surpluses.
The influence on European purchasing power of dis-
locations in the balances of payments was felt in two direc-
tions: (1) the exchange dislocations were partly respon-
sible for the extension of production in those countries
which experienced severe difficulties in settling their bal-
ances of payments; (2) bilateral trade grew at the expense
of multi-lateral trade.
Section I.
3. Influence of population growth and per capita demand
To gauge the influence of changes in total demand on
the post-WTar depression in wheat itis necessary to con-
sider shifts in the demand curve for wheat.Before the
War population increased continuously.V/bile the per-
centage increase in the production of wheat exceeded that
in population, the relative firmness of wheat prices suggests
that per capita demand for increased sufficiently to
balance
The decrease in population and possible changes in de-
mand during some of the V/ar years need not concern us
here, since the situation was undoubtedly dominated by the
small supply.If changes in demand had any influence on
the depression in wheat, they became clear only after the
War.Table 13 may help to clarify the point.
In forty countries (excluding Russia, China and Tur-
key)average population during 1931-36 was 20.3 per
cent greater than during 1910-14.Other things remain-
ing the same, this would have meant a proportionate in-
crease in the demand for wheat.But other things did not
remain the same.An important variable, which however
we can estimate only very roughly, was the changing per
capita demand for wheat.As Table 13 shows, per capita
consumption in the United States decreased some 13 per
cent.We may argue that because of the high standard
of living in the United States, this decrease is not greatly
dependent on factors of supply but represents largely ac-
tual shifts in per capita demand (assuming, of course, ex-
9t is assumed that the supply curve for wheat did not rise.
What we know of the changing conditions of production in wheat
and of industrial production and demand suggests that in fact




WHEAT DURING 1910-1914 AND 1931-1936
WHEAT CONSUMPTION PERCENTAGE CHANGES, 1910-1914 TO
193 1-193 6 Total Per capita
(in millions of bushels) (in bushels)
Average AverageChange Average Average Change In In totalIn per capita
1910-141931-36 1910-141931-36 populationconsumption consumption
World1 3,083 3,487 +404 3.57 3.36 —.21 +20.3 +13.1 —5.9
\Vestern Europe2 1,176 1,274 6.76 6.41 —.35 +14.4 +8.3 —5.2
United States 665 +89 6.08 5.27 —.81 +32.6 +15.5 —13.3
Orient 333 412 +79 .87 .91 .04 +18.6 +23.7 4.6
Three major exporters3 201 258 10.36 8.77 —1.59 +52.6 +28.4 —15.3
Other countries' 797 378 +81 4.13 3.79 —.34 +19.7 +10.2 —8.2
M. K. Bennett, World Wheat Utilization since 1885-86; Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, Vol. XII, No. 10,
June 1936.
.
'40countries (Russia, China and Turkey excluded).
'12 countries: Great Britain, Irish Free State, France,Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden.
3Canada, Australia, Argentina.
'21 countries: Germany, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bul-
garia, Greece, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, South Africa, New Zealand, Chile, Uruguay.Technical Progress and Agricultural Depression 25
tremelv inelastic demand). There can be little doubt that
actual per capita demand the world over has not declined
as much as it has in the United States.But even if we
assume, as an extreme case, that world per capita demand
also declined 13 per cent, it is still obvious that there can-
not have been a decline in the demand curve for wheat;
•there must have been a rise.The increase in population,
20.3 per cent, more than balanced the assumed decline in
• per capita demand, 13.3 per cent.There is consequently
little ground for saying that the change in total demand
for wheat after the War was a positive factor in bringing
about the depression in However, since the popu-
lation movement of the last decade indicates a strong pos-
sibility that the growth of world population will in the
future be insufficient to counterbalance a continued de-
cline in per capita demand, the demand factor may become
an important determinant of future conditions.
The influence of consumption on the wheat depression
may be considered from another angle.Is it significant
that population and per capita consumption did not follow
the trend?Had the pre-War trend continued,
total annual consumption 1931-36 would have been 9.5
per cent above the actual consumption, according to com-
putations of the Food Research Institute.There is,of
course, no reason to believe that wheat farmers planned
production afterthe11'Var,confident that consumption
would follow the pre-War trend.But even the argument
that the maintenance of the pre-War trend in consumption
would have checked the formation of excessive stocks
would, probably, misrepresent the situation.Had total
consumption followed the pre-WTar trend, the movement
of wheat prices would have been more favorable to
wheatpolicy
of the European importing countries.The advantages of
large scale mechanized wheat farming disappear ifthe
price of wheat falls below a minimum determined by over-
head costs.If the price had moved above this critical
point, large scale farming would have expanded far above
the present level40 in certain districts of the United States
as well as in Canada, Argentina and Australia.More-
over, a period of high prices would have facilitated the
9t is also impossible to establish a direct influence of the indus-
trial depression on world consumption of wheat and on wheat
farming.In some countries, however, in which the standard of
living isrelatively low, the depression starting in 1929 seems
to have contributed to a decline in consumption.In the above-
quoted study of the Food Research Institute, Mr. Bennett stites
that in some countries—Germany, Austria, Italy, and parts of
eastern Europe—the reduction in employment and income during
the industrial depression resulted in decreased consumption of
wheat and shifts toward cheaper cereals.
'0As shown above, the period 1920-29 is distinctive in that wheat
production was mechanized and expanded particularly when
prices were favorable to large scale mechanized.farms..
acquisition of machinery and the expansion of acreage for
the reason that higher farm incomes as well as better credit
opportunities would have prevailed.The consequences of
such a situation would probably have been a greater ex-
pansion of total wheat acreage than was actually experi-
enced.There is no reason to believe that under these
hypothetical conditions an ultimate depression would have.
been avoided.
4. Implications
Demand factors may have been partly responsible both
for the timing of the outbreak of the wheat depression and
for its accentuation.Let us now attempt to evaluate the
prospects for the future utilization of wheat, and their
bearing upon the problem of overcoming the depression.
The decline in wheat imports of the former wheat im-
porting countries, particularly of western Europe, is due
to various causes.The most important is certainly the in-
crease in wheat acreage and production in these countries,
arising from the desire to protect the farmer or to prepare
for war, and, not least, from the necessity of meeting for-
•eign trade and foreign exchange difficulties. These incentives
to home production may not be so strong in the future; if
not, per capita consumption, especially in those countries
whose standard of living is low or moderate, will rise when
domestic wheat prices fall.From a short term point of
view such an occurrence may be quite important for the
mitigation of the world wheat crisis, but it could not solve
the wheat problem in the long run.As we have tried to
show, the crucial feature in the wheat depression is supply.
Adverse climatic conditions, as in the drought years 1934
and 1936, play a role in improving the wheat situation and
lowering stocks for a short time.These circumstances, as
well as the immediate effect of the depression on wheat
farmers in all size groups, may retard and delay a further
resort to mechanized production with its concomitant in-
crease in output.In the long run, however, mechaniza-
tion will undoubtedly progress.Acreage and production
will tend to increase and the elimination of farmers may be
expected to continue. We can therefore hardly state that
the depression in wheat has been definitely overcome.
The prospects for a notable increase in demand for
wheat are few. A change to a liberal agricultural and
tariff policy in France, Germany and Italy (which is not
very probable) may lead to an increase in per capita con-
sumption.Wheat consumption in the Orient may also
increase, if political and economic conditions improve. On
the other hand, in countries with a high standard of living
consumption will decline further.In the long run this
factor may important.According to a study of
the Department of Agriculture, the attainment of a liberal
('ideal') diet would cut present per capita consumption of26 National Bureau of Economic Research
wheat flour about half.41One would be very optimistic
indeed to expect under such conditions a solution of the
wheat problem from the demand side.
B. OTHER FACTORS IN THE COTTON DEPRESSION
The analysis of the role of mechanization in cotton
farming brought to light no evidence that dislocations could
have led to a slow process of adjustment and thus to a long
depression.Cotton was not dependent upon ex-
pansion of production as a result of mechanization.In-
stead, production seemed to be influenced especially by
boll-weevil damage and attempts to compensate for it by
expanding acreage.It we exclude the effect of these in-
fluences on the well-being of cotton farmers, the hypo-
thesis seems plausible that their income is greatly affected
by fluctuations in consumers' incomes and inindustrial
production, i.e., by the course of business cycles,it would
imply that depressions in cotton farming may be caused by
industrial depressions and that fluctuations in cotton f arm-
ers' income are short.Is this hypothesis confirmed by the
movement of cotton farmers' income?
To find a series adequately representing the income of
cotton farmers is as difficult as it was to find one showing
the prosperity of wheat farmers. The series of net income
of cotton farmers and per capita purchasing power of net
income from cotton, contained in a study on the cotton
farmer's position, by Philip H. Bollinger under the di-
rection of L. H. Bean, seems the best available.'2
Net income was calculated by deducting estimated cash
costs of production from farm income derived from lint and
seed. This series was deflated by the cost of living index of
cotton farmers.A second series was selected expressing
per capita purchasing power of net income from cotton.
Owing to the relatively small changes in the number of
cotton farmers as compared with crop, price and expense
changes, this second series closely parallels the first,as
Chart 8 shows.Despite possible limitations, these series
indicate roughly the changes in the economic situation of
cotton farmers.If we assume that the average for 1910-
14 fairly represents normal conditions in cotton farming,
conditions more favorable than normal prevailed in four
years between 1920 and 1934.Except in 1923-25 and
F. Stiebeling and Medora M. %Vard, Diets at Four Levels
of Nutritive content and Cost, U. S. Department of Agriculture,
circular 296, 1933.
'2Cf. Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Program Planning
Division, Agricultural Industrial Relations Section, U. S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture; Cotton, Facts relating to cotton prices and
purchasing power, out-of-pocket cost of production,net farm
income from cotton and purchasing power of income, relation of
net income from cotton to national income and other data bear-
ing on the cotton farmer's economic position; prepared by Philip
H. Boflinger under the direction of L. H. Bean, Washington,
I). C., August 1935.
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1927,net income of cotton farmers was much below 1910-
14.This becomes even more apparent if we compare cot-
ton farmers' income with non-agricultural income, the lat-
ter deflated by an index of urban cost of living.
It is possible that the social system of cotton farming
and the fact that much of the cotton acreage represents
marginal land'3 under conditions prevailing during most
of the post-War period contributed to the depressed situa-
tion of cotton farming.But this is hardly an adequate
explanation.Undoubtedly these factors greatly influenced
the position of cotton farmers after the War but it is im-
possible to attribute the post-War situation in cotton farm-
ing solely or predominantly to them.If there was a long
depression in cotton farming, which is by no means
tam, we are not able to give a satisfactory explanation oi
its origin.
'3Cf. W. W. Ashe, Marginal Land and Cotton Prices, Journal
of Farm Economics, October 1931, p. 590: "Possibly as much as
10 per cent of the present crop was produced upon land which is
marginal under existing economic conditions and with present
standards of living."
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The hypothesis that the position of cotton farmers de-
pends upon fluctuations in general business activity calls
for some consideration.As an indicator of general busi-
ness fluctuations, the Day-Persons Index of Manufactur-
ing Production was chosen, supplemented from 1930 on by
monthly averages of the Federal Reserve Board Index of
Manufacturing Production.Cotton farmers' net income
rose from 1921 to 1923 with manufacturing activity.
However, during the industrial upswings of 1924-26 and
1927-29, it fell sharply.Thus, comparison of net income
of cotton farmers and manufacturing activity hardly sub-
stantiates the hypothesis that total net income of cotton
farmers is dependent on business activity within the United
States.
Business conditions in the United States apparently do
not control total income of cotton farmers.This may be
due to the fact that roughly half of the American cotton
crop is exported and that the amount exported is deter-
mined by factors other than general business conditions
in the United States. We therefore separate total income
of cotton farmers into income derived from exports and
income derived from domestic consumption (again based
on the computations of Messrs. Bollinger and Bean).
The movement of gross income from cotton lint consumed
in the United States (Chart 9), together with the move-
ment of income from cotton lint exported and the Day-
Persons-Federal Reserve Board Index of Manufacturing
Production, reveals a picture that is very different from the
observation based on total income of cotton farmers. Dur-
ing both 1921-23 and 1927-29 income from. domestic lint
consumption moved upward with business revivals, the in-
crease in income from domestic consumption starting one
year before the business revival, 1927.To test the con-
formity indicated by yearly figures we analyze monthly
data of cotton consumption in American mills.It is clear
that the non-conformity of total income of cotton farmers
and business conditions in the United States is largely duei
to the movement of income derived from exports.There-
fore, it is essential to consider separately the conditions un-
derlying domestic consumption of raw cotton and the fac-
tors determining foreign demand for American cotton.
1. Domestic Demand for Cotton
The utilization of cotton as a raw material for clothing,
household and industrial goods is rather closely connected
with industrial production and with cyclical fluctuations in
the incomes of the industrial population.The dependence
of demand for cotton on the industrial cycle is determined
by several factors and hence is not clear cut.There are
few statistics available that separate the percentage of cot-
ton used for clothing and household purposes from that
used for industrial purposes."The indications are, how-
ever, that there is a decided trend toward an increase in
1910 1915
See note to Chart 8
theindustrial use of cotton in the United States; con-
sumption for clothing and household use has declined. The
Department of Agriculture estimates the yearly domestic
mill consumption (which represents the total use of cotton)
at 26.3 pounds per capita in the five-year period ended
1909-10, as against 26.2 pounds during the five-year period
ended 1930-31.In the later period an equivalent of 3.2
pounds per capita was used in the production of automo-
biles and casings alone, a negligible item in the earlier pen-
od.'° In a year of high industrial production, as 1929, about
"For 1924 the percentage of Cotton piece. goods used for indus-
trial purposes (manufacture of furniture, awnings, shoes, mat-
tresses, tires, etc.) was estimated at 30; cf. Distribution of Tex-
tiles, Bureau of Business Research, Harvard University, Bull. 56,
p. 155.Of total 1929 production of cotton fabrics, yarns and
felts amounting to 8,500,000,000 square yards, 2,200,000,000 were
used chiefly for garments, 1,500,000,000 chieflyfor household
goods and 1,100,000,000 for one of these two purposes, whereas
3,700,000,000 were destined for other purposes, i.e., in 1929, 43
per cent of the production was used for industrial purposes.Cf.
Report of the National Survey of Potential Product Capacity,
prepared under the sponsorship of the New York City Housing
Authority and Works Division of the Emergency Relief Bureau,
City of New York, 1935, p. 111.
'°Cf. Maurice R. Cooper, The Position of American Cotton and
the American Cotton Producer, Address, 9th Annual Marketing
School, Little Rock, Arkansas, March. 4, 1936 (U. S. Department
of Agriculture), p. 11.28 National.Bureau of Economic Research
10 per cent of the entire cotton consumption of the United
States was absorbed by the automobile tire industry, and
another 3 per cent was used by the automobile industry
proper for car tops, upholstery, brake bands, etc.'4Con-
sumption of cotton for various other industrial purposes
has also increased, making cotton consumption more de-
pendent upon industrial fluctuations.The decline in per
capita consumption for clothing and household purposes,
is due mainly to changes in style and to competition of
other textile materials. The growing competition of other
materials may be indicated by the rise in rayon production,
which averaged 20 million pounds in 1910-14 (world pro-
duction) and 775 million pounds in 1934.The pre-War
production of 'rayon equaled, on a pound per pound basis,
40,000 bales of cotton as against 1,600,000 bales in 1934,
which corresponds to 30 per cent of American mill con-
sumption.The rise in American rayon production is even
more startling. Before the War production was negligible;
itis now about 250,000,000 pounds.47
The character of the fluctuations in the demand for raw
cotton depends upon the use to which it is put.Demand
"Cf. Yearbook of JI9riculiure, 1933, p. 105.
40n the other hand, the increase does not mean a net loss to
cotton since rayon production contributes to the demand for cot-
ton (in 1929, 61 million pounds of cotton linters were used in the
American production of rayon, according to the Census of Manu-
factures).
for clothing, still the most important item even in the
United States, is substantially affected by changes in con-
sumers' incomes, which follow the industrial cycle.Ap-
proximately the same relation holds for changes in demand
for household cotton goods.Cotton consumption for in-
dustrial purposes is less dependent upon cotton prices than
upon the situation of those' which use cotton.
The demand of industries using cotton as a subsidiary
material depends upon fluctuations in their output.Even
the demand of industries in which cotton as a raw material
constitutes a large percentage of the total costs of the final
product, such as the automobile tire industry, fluctuates
with business cycles.These too general statements re-
ferring to the demand for cotton may be supplemented and
tested by an analysis of the behavior of various cotton
consuming industries during business cycles.
Total mill consumption is determined by the activity
of several industries using cotton as a raw material.In
order to gauge the complexity of demand fluctuations in
these various industries, we analyze production in two
representative industries: textiles and automobile tires. S.Ve
take, in addition to total mill consumption: (a) billings of
finished cotton goods," as an indicator of the fluctuations
"The billings of finished cotton goods are approximately synony-
mous with production, goods being billed as completed and the
data being expressed in yards, not values.The series is based
on compilations ofthe National Associationof FinishersofTechnical Progress and Agricultural Depression 29
in cotton consumption for clothing and household pur-
poses; (b) the production of automobile tires (pneumatic
casings)as an indicator of the other industrial uses of
cotton (Chart 10).The dark lines refer to the season-
ally corrected figures, the dotted lines represent three-
month moving averages.The addition of a fourth series,
EventheStandardStatisticsindex of industrialproduction,
facilitates a comparison of the three series expressing ac-
tivity in industries using cotton with general industrial ac-
tivity.In order to make clear the movement of these
four series during business cycles, the troughs of business
cycles are indicated by black vertical lines, the peaks by
dotted verticallines.The timing of business cycles is
based on Professor Mitchell's chronology.49The peaks
and' troughs of the four. series here analyzed are marked
by asterisks.
Most significant is cotton consumption by mills, since it
indicates total industrial consumption of raw cotton.Dur-
ing the period here analyzed six cycles of cotton consump-
tion can be observed, which up to 1928 correspond fairly
well with general business cycles.During the latest busi-
ness cycle, which started in January 1928, reached a peak
in June 1929 and ended in March 1933, however, cotton
consumption experienced an extra specific cycle.This ex-
tra cycle must be attributed chiefly to variations in de-
mand.Doctors Mitchell and Burns explain that replace-
ments of such semi-durable necessities as textiles become
necessary after a year or two and that therefore any con-
traction in their production lasting more than about two
years will be followed by moderate upturns.W
A tendency for cotton consumption to lead at business
ci-cle troughs is noticeable in five out of six cycles observed.
Finished cotton goods (billings) move similarly to cotton
consumption by mills.This series also reveals an extra
cycle during the latest business cycle; the timing, particu-
larly in respect of the troughs, is very close to that of the
latter series.Automobile tire production (pneumatic cas-
ings)is strongly affected by the sharp upward trend of
automobile production during the first decade after the
\Var and by the shift from solid tires and cushions to
pneumatic casings.Thus, tire production declined only
Cotton Fabrics.White goods and dyed goods comprise each
about 40 per cent of total billings, printed goods about 20 per
cent.The series can be considered representative of total pro-
duction of the industry; white goods' in the series amounting to
70 per cent, dyed goods to￿5 per cent, and printed goods to
25 per cent o,f total production of each type.
U? '9Cf. Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles, iZol. Ii, of
Cyclical Behavior (a preliminary mimeographed draft of Chap-
ters I and II, p. 40, National Bureau of Economic Research, No-
vember 1935).
Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns, Production Dur-
ing the American Business Cycle, 1927-1933, National Bureau of
Economic Research Bull. 61, p. 18.
slightly during the business 'contraction of 1926-27.Nev-
ertheless, the influence of business cycles on tire produc-
tion is clear.
For the period that the various 'series cover, the evi-
dence points strongly toward a fairly close dependence of
the fluctuations of cotton consumption in the United States
upon the course of business cycles.It is not necessary to
analyze here the relations for individual cycles.The rise
during business expansions and the fall during contractions
(with the modifications mentioned and explained and the
provision for leads and lags) stand out so clearly that the
domination of these series by business cycles cannot be
doubted.This does not mean that no other factors affect
the extent and timing of' the fluctuations in demand for
cotton.But it does suggest that a rise in cotton consump-
tion can be expected in the course of business expansions
and that consumptionisadversely affected by business
depressions.
2. Foreign Demand
Cotton is a staple product with a world market.From
one-half' to two-thirds of total American production was
consumed in foreign countries during the last two de-
The share of foreign consumption in total pro-
duction of American cotton is illustrated in the accom-
panying These percentages mean that the demand
for American cotton is influenced as much by consumption
in foreign countries as by consumption in the United States,
if not more.








Three factors may be regarded as determining foreign
consumption of, American cotton.(1) General business
conditions in countries importing American cotton.(\'Ve
should note, however, that the relation of demand to do-
mestic business cycles in the main importing countries, par-
ticularly in the highly industrialized European countries, is
less close than in the United States, because they export a
higher percentage of their yarns and finished cotton goods.)
(2) Structural changes in the world cotton manufacturing
centers.(3) The competition of American cotton with
foreign grown cotton which takes place almost exclusively
in foreign countries using American cotton.
Since the War the influence of the domestic business
situation on cotton consumption in important industrial
Section B, Other Factors in the Cotton Depression.
and export figures, cf. U. S. Department of Agricul-
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countries has been overshadowed by structural changes in
the cotton industry and markets.The expansion of the
textile industries of oriental countries limited' the export
possibilities particularly of Great Britain, the most im-
portant consumer of American cotton.The increasing
capacity of oriental cotton mills, which use much less
American cottons is shown herewith.






'Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Notes on the Tex-
tile Industry in Lancashire, India, China and Japan, March 1933.
The shifts in cotton manufacture from occidental to
oriental countries continued after the world depression, as
a comparison of data for 1935 and 1925 increase
in spindles of 106 per cent in Japan, 45percent in China
and 21 per cent in India contrast with decreases of 29 per
cent in Great Britain and 21 per cent in the United States.
Between 1913 and 1932 the number of spindles in Asiatic
countries increased from 7 to 13 per cent of the world
spindleage; Asiatic cotton consumption increased from 19
to 3.5percent of world consumption.
Shifts in the capacity and consumption of the cotton in-
dustries affected not only conditions in Cotton mills, espe-
cially of European countries, but also the export of Amer-
ican raw cotton.Oriental mills depended largely upon
Egyptian and Indian cotton; European mills consumed
the computations of Leonard G. Ting, Recent Developments
in China's Cotton Industry, Nankai Social and Economic Quar-
terly.Vol.IX,No.2, July 1936, p. 398.
mostly American raw The changes in the use of
the various grades of cotton during the post-War period
are not due exclusively to shifts in the cotton industries.
The decrease in purchasing power due to the industrial
depression in the various Countries and foreign exchange
difficulties led to an increasing consumption of the cheaper
NUMBER OF SPINDLES AND CONSUMPTION OF RAW Corrow IN
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short staple qualities grown in foreign countries.TM Though
it is not possible to determine the relative influence of each
factor, their importance is seen in the changes in the con-
sumption of American, Egyptian and Indian cotton in im-
portant cotton manufacturing countries (Chart 11).
In the United States, consumption of foreign grown
cotton isstill negligible; fluctuations in consumption are
almost exclusively in domestic cotton.Most striking are
• the changes in consumption on the Continent. The 19 10-
of llgriculiure, 1932, p. 100.
9t may be noted that the purchase of cotton on a barter or com-
pensating trade basis has been of some significance in increasing
the consumption of foreign growths at the expense of American
cotton during the last few years.
'4
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CHART 11
TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF COTTON, BY TYPE
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14 peak in consumption of American cotton has been sur-
passed only once, in 1927, and then slightly.After a con-
tinuous rise from 1917 to 1927 (interrupted by slight de-
clines in1922 and 1923) the consumption of American
cotton declined except between 1930 and 1933.Until
1927 fluctuations intotal continental consumption were
due to changes in consumption of American cotton.
Even during this period a tendency toward increasing con-
sumption of Oriental cottonisnoticeable.After 1927
the decrease in consumption of American cotton was about
compensated by increasing consumption of 'sundry' cottons
(mostly Chinese), with consumption of Indian cotton also
Consumption of cotton in England is marked
by a continuous decline between 1924 and 1930, and by a
declining proportionof American cottontototalcon-
sumption.Oriental consumption moved sharply upward
after the War. The peak of world consumption of Amer-
ican cotton was reached in 1932.The increasing impor-
tance of Chinese cotton is apparent. Owing to a sharp in-
crease in consumption of 'sundry' cottons, American cot-
ton contributes now less than one-half to total world con-
sumption.
3. Sum
Under present conditions supply cannot be regarded as
decisive in the cotton depression.Cotton production can
be adjusted to changes in demand more readily than can
wheat production, although the perfection of the cotton
picker would probably bring far-reaching changes in this
respect. An important factor affecting the cotton situation
is general business activity in cotton consuming countries.
Income of cotton farmers can be expected to rise during
business revivals.
C. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF MECHANIZATION
Though mechanization changes in the farming sys-
tem are most advanced in wheat, mechanization is by no
means limited to wheat.It forced widespread shifts upon
American agriculture as a whole: the replacement of work
animals by tractors and automobiles reduced the needs for
feed and thus the amount of feed crop acreage.
This substitution must be considered as a factor con-
tributing to the difficulties of agriculture in general, especi-
ally at a time of severe dislocations in the farming system.CS
The transference to manufacturing industry of activities
fo regarded as belonging to agrkulture is no novel
-{ '.Thenarrowing range of farm activities explains
in large degree the migration of part of the farm population
to the cities.But probably never before has the replace-
is not an appraisal of the 'net' effects.The effects on in-
dustrv and the advantages resulting from reductions incosts
for certain farm products need not be considered here.
ment of typical farm activities by industrial processes been
so rapid and far-reaching as after the introduction of the
tractor.Dr. 0. E. Baker of the Department of Agricul-
ture has recently computed data of displaced acreage which
show that the decline in horses and mules on farms started
with the introduction of tractors during the \'Var; after
1920 it became more rapid.The replacement of horses by
the automobile and the tractor on farms was responsible
for a release to other uses of 30 million acres of crop land
and over 31millionacres of pasturage between 1915
and 1936.If we compare these with the crop
land harvested and total pasturage in the United States
(according to the Census of1930, 359 millionacres
of crop land were harvested and there were 379 million
acres in total pasturage) we can easily gauge the impor-
tance of this factor; nearly 10 per cent of total acreage and
pasturage was released through the replacement of draught
animals by mechanical devices. At the same time the num-
ber of horses in American citiesalso dropped sharply.
This decline started in 1910; between 1915 and 1936 it
resulted in a further release of over 12 million acres of
crop land. The importance of the release, during 1915-36,
of 42 million acres of crop land harvested may be better
illustrated if we consider that this acreage approximately
corresponds to the total expansion in acreage during the
World War, or that it falls short by only 15 per cent of
equaling the 50 million acres needed for the record ex-
ports of wheat, other cereals, tobacco and cotton in 1921.
Obviously the necessity of shifting the use of these 42 mil-
lion acres was an additional hardship to farmers.The
adjustment to this change, consisting mainly in a shift
toward increased production of meat and milk, was com-
plicated by the fact that it coincided with the changes in
farm organization brought about by mechanization.5'
We have noted that one effect of the mechanization
process was to put pressure on some wheat farmers to
grow other crops.Apparently they had insufficient capital
reserves to compete with large scale mechanized farms, or
their farms were not adapted to mechanized methods.
However, they could overcome these disadvantages by
growing crops irs which "mass production is either tech-
e.g., the following publications of Dr. 0. E. Baker: The
Outlook for Land Utilization, Journal of Farm Economic,, Vol.
XIII, No. 2, April 1931, p. 214; Agricultural Implications of the
Population Prospect in the United States, Proceedings of the
ThirdInternationalConferenceofAgriculturalEconomists
(London, 1935), p. 274; The Future Need for Farm Land, Ad-
dress at Farm and Home Week, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa,
February 9, revised August 1934, p. 17."Most of these
37 million acres more or less are now being used for the pro-
duction of meat and milk."32 National Bureau of Economic Research
nically impossible, or economically does not These
shifts contributed greatly to the expansion of dairy and
meat production; consequently thedepressioninthese
branches of agriculture became more
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION
The following remarks are based partly upon the evi-
dence presented in this Bulletin, partly on the research that
supplies the background for the entire study.To some
extent the opinions expressed are tentative.
The outstanding characteristics of the latest agricultural
depression are its length and severity.The situation in
wheat was most striking.In its specific form of a long
run phenomenon the agricultural depression appears as a
tedious process of adjustment, apparently made necessary
chiefly by rapid changes in technical conditions that led to
a notable expansion in production and a sharp decline in
prices.
The latest agricultural depression is by no means a uni-
form phenomenon.Even in wheat, where depression was
fairly continuous, a few years were not so bad.While
cotton farming also may possibly be regarded as depressed
since 1920, the leading causes were different from those
that affected wheat growing.In dairying, it is doubtful
whether we can speak of a grave depression.
Two questions arise: (1) What is the justification for
considering the agricultural depression as a whole?(2)
\Vhy does the depression assume different forms from one
branch of farming to another?
A priori, there isriological basis for regarding the
'agricultural depression' as a unit.But the severe decline
in wheat prices forced many farmers to shift to other
branches of farming, which were less depressed and not
subject to the competition of more advanced techniques,
and which produce goods having higher elasticity of de-
mand.Such shifts were noticeable before the depression,
but they were accelerated and accentuated by the de-
pression in wheat.
In the course of the post-\Var industrial depression
these other branches also suffered from decline in urban
incomes.Even ifthese repercussions had not been of
55Cf. George Pavlovsky, The Cause of the Agricultural Depres-
sion in 1931-32, International Institute of Agriculture, Monthly
Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, 1933, No. 1.
Dr. Pavlovsky refers to the shifts in farming made by European
farmers. to avoid oversea competition.
"The situation in dairy farming is analyzed ina forthcoming
book by the senior author.For the United States it was found
that the prosperity of dairy farmers depends largely upon gen-
eral business conditions, which affect not so much the volume of
consumption as prices and consequently total incomes of dairy
farmers.
major importance, the coincidence of the long run depres-
sion in wheat with depressed conditions in those branches
which are influenced by changing business activity seems
to justify the term 'agricultural depression' for the post-
War period.This is more true if we take into account
other relations among the various branches of farming.
There is little doubt that the disturbances in wheat were
due in large measure to rapid changes in production meth-
ods.In wheat, mechanization was carried through on a
large scale and the effects of the rapid expansion of pro-
duction were oversupph' and falling prices.The decline
in prices was especially sharp because of the inelastic de-
mand for staple foods. The declining trend of wheat prices
is due to the predominance of these long run factors.
Why does the adjustment process initiated by technical
changes not take place immediately without causing severe
disturbances?Technical changes are going on continu-
ously, and indeed for decades the adjustment to such minor
changes may leave the agricultural economy undisturbed.
But rapid changes make adjustments very difficult because
of the peculiarities of farming.Wheat is the outstanding
example at present.
In cotton, mechanization is still in its beginning.But
even a sudden change in production methods would have
consequences that would differ from those in wheat; other
things being equal the adjustment process would be much
shorter, because of the higher elasticity of demand for cot-
ton.Since the War changes in production methods have
played only a minor part in the cotton situation, while
fluctuations in domestic industrial consumption and in for-
eign demand have been important.
There is no evidence that long run depression in agri-
culture is a regularly recurrent phenomenon. The task of
theory is to determine the conditions under which a de-
pression in this sense can be expected.Rapid technical
progress is a decisive, but not a sufficient condition.From
the evidence of the latest depression, such factors as a
sharp rise and subsequent decline in real estate values, high
indebtedness on account of this situation, difficulties in in-
ternational trade and exchange such as those following the
War, may well be regarded as aggravating conditions.
The agricultural depression began nearly a decade before
the great industrial depression.The preceding analysis
suggests that we cannot expect the agricultural depression
to end soon, so far as wheat is concerned, although it
may be alleviated for short periods.The end of the
difficulties for wheat depends upon two conditions: either
the level of production in the leading wheat producing
countries will have to be reduced, or demand must in-
crease notably.There is little evidence that demand will
increase to any extent.And any temporary rise in wheat
prices is likely to stimulate further
C
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